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Federal Sentencing Guidelines
by James T. Skuthan
and
Rosemary T. Cakmis'*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1999 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals broke new ground on
a variety of issues related to the United States Sentencing Guidelines
("U.S.S.G.").'
A significant number of cases interpreted firearms
possession in connection with various offenses;2 loss calculations for
fraud offenses;8 Chapter Three adjustments, such as role,4 obstruction
of justice,' and reckless endangerment;' and U.S.S.G. Section 5K depar-

* Assistant Federal Public Defender, Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division.
Auburn University (B.A., 1980); Florida State University (J.D., 1985). Member, The
Florida Bar; United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida; Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals.
** Assistant Federal Public Defender, Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division.
University of Florida (B.S., 1979; J.D., 1981). Member, The Florida Bar; United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida; Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
1. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL (1998).
2. See United States v. Wooden, 169 F.3d 674 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. MatesRodriguez, 188 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Clavijo, 165 F.3d 1341
(11th Cir. 1999).
3. See United States v. Hedges, 175 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Sigma
Intl, Inc., 196 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Miller, 188 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir.
1999).
4. See United States v. Rodriguez De Varon, 175 F.3d 930 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc),
vacating 136 F.3d 740 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Campbell, 181 F.3d 1263 (11th
Cir. 1999); United States v. Matthews, 168 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Cataldo, 171 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 1999).
5. See United States v. Witherell, 186 F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Rudisill, 187 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Cataldo, 171 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir.
1999); United States v. Hitt, 164 F.3d 1370 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Gregg, 179
F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Diaz, 190 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Magluta, 198 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated inpart,203 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir.
2000).
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tures.7 At the same time, the court consistently refused to revisit
previously decided issues, such as the constitutionality of the crack
cocaine guidelines,' and sided with the majority of circuits in resolving
issues of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit.9
II.

1999 SENTENCING GUIDELINES DECISIONS FROM THE ELEVENTH
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

A.

Chapter One: Introduction and General Application Princi-

ples-Relevant Conduct

Although most relevant-conduct cases are discussed in connection with
Chapter Two, a few are noted in connection with Chapter One to give a
preliminary overview. Relevant conduct is a recurrent theme in drug
cases. For example, in United States v. Matthews,'° several defendants
challenged the district court's drug-quantity calculations under U.S.S.G.
Section 1B1.3(a). The Eleventh Circuit noted that
[iun determining the base level of the charged offense, the district court
must consider as relevant all conduct actually undertaken by, or taken
at the direction of, the defendant, § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A), and, in the case of
a conspiracy, all acts by other participants that were both reasonably
foreseeable and in furtherance of the conspiracy, § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)."

In United States v. Cook, 2 a bank robbery case, the court vacated
and remanded a Section 3C1.2 sentencing enhancement for reckless
endangerment during flight from a police officer."3 The enhancement

6. See United States v. Cook, 181 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. MatesRodriguez, 188 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Sawyer, 180 F.3d 1319 (11th
Cir. 1999).
7. See United States v. Melvin, 187 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Sawyer, 180 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Magluta, 198 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir.
1999), vacated in part, 203 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Steele, 178 F.3d
1230 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Pickering, 178 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Mignott, 184 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 1999).
8. See United States v. Wilson, 183 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Matthews, 168 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Rutherford, 175 F.3d 899 (11th
Cir. 1999).
9. See United States v. Wooden, 169 F.3d 674, 676 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Garrett, 190 F.3d 1220, 1222-23 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Ortega-Torres, 174 F.3d
1199, 1200 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Richardson, 166 F.3d 1360, 1361 (11th Cir.
1999); United States v. Mignott, 184 F.3d 1288, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 1999).
10. 168 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 1999).
11. Id. at 1247.
12. 181 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 1999).
13. Id. at 1236.
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had been imposed on two codefendants who exited the getaway car
before the driver led police on a dangerous high-speed chase. The
district court held the two codefendant passengers responsible for the
driver's involvement in the chase, finding that the chase was relevant
conduct under Section 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)."4 Reversing the district court,
the Eleventh Circuit explained that relevant conduct under Section
1B1.3, which extends to all "reasonably foreseeable" conduct in jointly
undertaken criminal activity, applies "'[ulnIess otherwise specified'"
elsewhere in the guidelines.' 5 Section 3C1.2 specifies otherwise
because it holds defendants responsible only for conduct that they
"'aided or abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully
caused.'"" The court found that this guideline limited defendants'
responsibility to conduct in which they "directly engaged" or conduct in
which they "actively 'aided or abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
procured or wilfully caused' another to engage."" The court further
noted that a contrary reading of Section 3C1.2 would make the
enhancement applicable to "virtually everyone whose co-conspirators fled
from law enforcement immediately following the commission of a crime,
resulting in a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to
another person."18

In United States v. Hedges,"9 a securities fraud case, the district court
determined that the loss attributed to defendant's fraudulent conduct
exceeded $92 million for sentencing purposes. Defendant argued that
there was insufficient evidence to establish he reasonably foresaw that
amount of loss and that the district court improperly relied on conclusory
statements in the presentence report ("PSR") to support its loss amount
decision.2" The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, noting that defendant did
not object to the statements in the PSR; thus, the sentencing court was

14. Id. at 1233-34.
15. Id. at 1234-35 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)) (alteration in original).
16. Id. at 1235 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 application n.5).
17. Id. at 1236 (quoting U.S.S.G § 3C1.2 application n.5). The court pointed out that

all other circuits that have considered this question "required more than evidence of an
endangering conduct that was reasonably foreseeable." Id. at 1235 (citing United States
v. Conley, 131 F.3d 1387, 1390-91 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Lipsey, 62 F.3d 1134,
1136-37 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Hall, 71 F.3d 569, 571-72 (6th Cir. 1995)). The
court distinguished the illustration found in Section 1B1.3(b)(1), which holds getaway
drivers responsible for injuries that occur during an armed bank robbery, because that
guideline does not apply to "flight" following a bank robbery, a situation for which Section
3C1.2 "otherwise" specifies the punishment. Id. at 1236 n.1.

18. Id. at 1236.
19. 175 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 1999).
20. Id. at 1313-15.
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allowed "to rely on them despite the absence of supporting evidence."2'
Because the statements established that defendant played an important
role in the overall conspiracy, they were sufficient to support the $92
million loss amount.22
Relevant conduct under Section 1B1.3(a)(2) includes "illegal conduct
not in furtherance of the offense of conviction if that conduct was 'part
of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan' as the offense
of conviction." 23 In United States v. Gomez,24 the court defined the
"course of conduct" by looking to the indictment and the evidence
adduced at trial.2' The court then held that because defendant's
uncharged cocaine sales to a specified individual were not part of the
same course of conduct as the conspiracy alleged in the indictment and
focused on at trial, those sales should not have been included in
calculating his base offense level.2"
B.

Chapter Two: Offense Conduct

1. Part A-Offenses Against the Person: Kidnapping; and Part
E-Offenses Involving Criminal Enterprises and Racketeering
The court discussed the interplay between the kidnapping27 and
racketeeringe, guidelines in United States v. DiGiorgio.29 Under the
racketeering guidelines, a defendant is sentenced based upon the greater
of a given base offense level or "the offense level applicable to the
underlying crime or racketeering activity."3 0 The predicate convictions
for the racketeering activity in DiGiorgiowere conspiracies to commit

21.

Id. at 1315.

22.

Id. The court also rejected defendant's argument that the Government violated its

obligation under the plea agreement to recommend a sentence based upon a lesser amount
of loss. Id. at 1316-17. Defendant claimed the Government breached a plea agreement by,
among other things, disputing defendant's narrow interpretation of relevant conduct under
Section 1B1.3. Id. at 1316. The court conducted a plain error analysis because counsel
failed to object at sentencing. Id. at 1317. In affirming, the court found no plain error,
holding that the agreement did not bind the Government regarding the total loss or the
proper interpretation of "relevant conduct." Id.
23. United States v. Gomez, 164 F.3d 1354, 1356 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.3(a)(2)).
24. 164 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1999).
25. Id. at 1356.
26. Id. at 1356-57.
27. U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1.
28. U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1(a)(2) (guideline applicable to 18 U.S.C. § 1962); U.S.S.G.
§ 2E1.3(a)(2) (guideline applicable to 18 U.S.C. § 1959).
29. 193 F.3d 1175 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
30. U.S.S.G. § 2E1.3(a)(2); see also U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1(a)(2).
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murder and kidnapping.3 1 The Eleventh Circuit noted that "[b]ecause
the jury's general verdict did not indicate which of the charged predicate
acts it believed [defendants] had committed, the district court was
required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant[s]
conspired to commit [a] particular object offense and sentence [them]
accordingly."12 Applying the clearly erroneous standard of review, the
Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's finding that the Government
had not sufficiently proven that defendant conspired to commit murder,
but had proven that he conspired to commit the kidnapping. 3 Thus,
the less severe kidnapping guidelines were applicable.'
In the same case, defendant appealed the six-level enhancement under
Section 2A4.1(b)(1) for a ransom demand made during the kidnapping.
The ransom demanded in that case was repayment of a debt already
owed to defendant.35 The court rejected defendant's argument that the
debt could not be considered a ransom for purposes of Section 2A4. 1(b)(1).36 Because the guidelines do not define "ransom," the court relied
on the definition found in Black's Law Dictionary,that is, "'[tihe money,
price, or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a kidnapped
person or persons; a payment that releases from captivity.' 37 The
court held that the definition did not exclude money the kidnapper
believed was owed to him by the victim.38
2. Part B-Offenses Involving Property
a. Robbery. Section 2B3.1(b)(2) provides for various enhancements if
the robbery involved a dangerous weapon, depending on how the weapon
was used.39 In United States v. Wooden, 4° defendant appealed his

31.
32.
33.
34.

193 F.3d at 1177.
Id. at 1177-78 (internal quotation marks omitted) (fourth alteration in original).
Id.
Id. at 1178.

35. Id.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1260 (6th ed. 1990)) (alteration in original).
Id.

39. Section 2B3.1(b)(2) provides,
(A) If a firearm was discharged, increase by 7 levels; (B) if a firearm was
otherwise used, increase by 6 levels; (C) if a firearm was brandished, displayed,
or possessed, increase by 5 levels; (D) if a dangerous weapon was otherwise used,

increase by 4 levels; (E) if a dangerous weapon was brandished, displayed, or
possessed, increase by 3 levels; or (F) if a threat of death was made, increase by
2 levels.
U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(bX2).
40.

169 F.3d 674 (11th Cir. 1999).

1194

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

sentence for carijacking, in which the district court applied the six-level
enhancement under Section 2B3.1(b)(2)(B) for "otherwise us[ing] a
firearm." Defendant argued that the district court should have enhanced
his offense level by only five levels under Section 2B3. 1(b)(2)(C) for
brandishing a firearm.4 As a matter of first impression, the court held
that the six-level enhancement for "'otherwise us[ing]' a firearm" applied
because defendant "pointed the handgun at a specific victim, holding the
gun one-half inch from the victim's forehead." 2 The court explained
that this conduct amounted to "more than brandishing; it was more than
merely
pointing or waving the weapon about in a threatening man" 43
ner.
b.
Counterfeiting. In United States v. Matos-Rodriguez,4 the
district court increased defendant's sentence for counterfeiting offenses
by two levels under Section 2B5.1(b)(3) for possession of a dangerous
weapon in connection with the offenses." In a case of first impression,
the court adopted an expansive reading of the phrase "in connection
with" that encompassed defendant's conduct.
Defendant delivered
counterfeit money to the informant and attempted to leave the area
when approached by agents. While fleeing from the agents, defendant
threw a loaded pistol from his car. 47 In affirming the enhancement, the
Eleventh Circuit held that defendant's conduct constituted possession of
a dangerous weapon "in connection with" the counterfeiting offense.4
The court further concluded that defendant "possessed the pistol to

41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 675.
Id. at 676.
Id.
188 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 1999).

45. Id. at 1305.
46. Id. at 1305, 1308-09. The Eleventh Circuit relied on United States v. Young, 115
F.3d 834 (11th Cir. 1997). In Young the district court sentenced defendant as an armed
career criminal under Section 4B1.4(b)(3)(A). Defendant had stolen a rifle during the
commission of a burglary, which was the crime of violence underlying the armed career
criminal enhancement. The court found that he possessed the rifle "in connection with" the
crime of violence. Id. at 835-36. Section 4B1.4(b)(3)(A) provides for an offense level of 34
"if
the defendant used or possessed the firearm or ammunition in connection with a crime
of violence." U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A). In Matos-Rodriguez the court reached the
conclusion that the rifle stolen in the burglary was possessed in connection with that
burglary "by affording the phrase 'in connection with' an expansive construction, in effect
holding that it did not matter whether Young had entered the dwelling with the gun in his
hand or obtained it while burglarizing the house, as a fruit of the crime." 188 F.3d at 1308.
The court held that the same "expansive construction" of the phrase "in connection with"
should be used in applying Section 2B5.1(b)(3). Id. at 1308-09.
47. 188 F.3d at 1302-03.
48. Id. at 1309.
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prevent theft during a close, face-to-face, hand-to-hand encounter with
the person he apparently did not know well."49
3. Part D-Offenses Involving Drugs
In 1999 drug cases continued to play a predominant role in Eleventh
Circuit case law. As with most guidelines issues, the court has taken a
conservative stance in reviewing drug-related sentences.
a. U.S.S.G. Section 2D1.1-Drug-Quantity Calculations.
Relying
on Eleventh Circuit precedent," the court disposed of all challenges to
the constitutionality of the crack cocaine guidelines and the disparity
between the crack cocaine and powder cocaine guidelines 5 without
much discussion. 2 The court also rejected several challenges to drugquantity calculations based on a variety of circumstances.
In Matthews the court found that the district court did not clearly err
in calculating the amount of drugs attributable to defendants in
determining their base offense level.53 Affirming the district court, the
court held that if the record supported the district court's determination
of the drug quantity, the district court was not required to make
individual findings about the scope of each defendant's criminal
activity.54 In United States v. Rutherford,55 the Eleventh Circuit
summarily rejected a challenge to the Government's proof concerning the
type of drugs involved, noting that the testimony of the chemist and the
detective adequately supported the district court's factual finding that
the drugs were crack cocaine.56

49. Id.
50. See United States v. Sloan, 97 F.3d 1378, 1383 n.8 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating the
guidelines' definition of "crack" is not so ambiguous that the district court should have
disregarded the increased crack cocaine penalties pursuant to the rule of lenity); United
States v. Byse, 28 F.3d 1165, 1170-71 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Williams, 876 F.2d

1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1989) (distinction between "cocaine base" and "cocaine" is not vague
because "cocaine base" refers to crack).
51. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c).
52. United States v. Wilson, 183 F.3d 1291, 1298 n.12 (11th Cir. 1999); United States
v. Matthews, 168 F.3d 1234, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Rutherford, 175
F.3d 899, 906 (11th Cir. 1999).

53. 168 F.3d at 1247-48.
54. Id. at 1247.
55. 175 F.3d 899 (11th Cir. 1999).
56. Id. at 905-06.
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The guidelines provide for different penalties depending on the type
5 the
of methamphetamine involved.5 7 In United States v. Ramsdale,"
Eleventh Circuit found that testimony regarding the value of the
methamphetamine sold, the value of the drugs, and the continuing
nature of defendants' drug business supported the district court's finding
that the drug was D-methamphetamine."9 The court then found no
reversible error in the amount of drugs attributed to defendants because
even if6 a lesser amount was involved, the guidelines would remain the
same.

0

In United States v. Diaz,6 ' defendant challenged the district court's
drug quantity calculations because one of the Government's witnesses
62
was ambiguous as to how much cocaine defendant actually supplied.
The Eleventh Circuit found that the district court did not commit clear
error because when the most conservative estimate given by the witness
was combined with other unchallenged quantities attributed to
defendant, his guideline range remained the same.'
In United States v. Chastain,"4 the district court calculated defendant's sentencing guidelines based on eight hundred to nine hundred
pounds of marijuana.6 The Eleventh Circuit found no clear error
despite defendant's argument that this amount of marijuana was greater
than what the airplanes involved could have carried because evidence

57. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c); see also United States v. Patrick, 983 F.2d 206, 208 (11th Cir.
1993).
58. 179 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 1999).
59. Id. at 1324-25.
60. Id. at 1325. The district court attributed 42 kilograms of D-methamphetamine to
defendants by finding that 42 kilograms of phenylacetic acid converted to an equal amount
of methamphetamine. The evidence indicated that defendants expected to have 21
kilograms in the very near future, in addition to 21 kilograms that had been ordered
earlier. Also, an accomplice testified defendants would probably buy additional amounts
of phenylacetic acid. Even if the total amount attributed to defendants was 36 kilograms
(the 21 kilograms previously ordered, plus the 15 kilograms testified to by the accomplice),
the difference would not affect defendants' sentence because the guideline range for 36
kilograms was the same as for 42 kilograms. Id.
The court also affirmed the district court's reliance on a one-to-one conversion ratio of
phenylacetic acid to methamphetamine, notwithstanding contrary expert testimony,
because the ratio was within the range of other testimony, and credibility determinations
by the district court should be accepted by the appellate court. Id.
61. 190 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 1999).
62. Id. at 1255-56.
63. Id.
64. 198 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 1999).
65. Id. at 1353.
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supported a conspiracy to import approximately
marijuana.6

1500 pounds of

b.
U.S.S.G. Section 2D1.1(b)(1)-Enhancement for Possessing a
Firearm During a Drug Offense. Under Section 2D1.1, two offense
levels are added for crimes involving drugs if the defendant possessed a
dangerous weapon, such as a firearm. Application note 3 to Section
2D1. 1 provides for such an adjustment if the weapon was present, unless
it was "clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the
offense."67 In 1998 this enhancement was the topic of much discussion
in the Eleventh Circuit. In 1999 the court further clarified several
situations in which this enhancement can be imposed.
In United States v. Diaz," firearms were found at defendant's home,
along with materials used in drug trafficking. Additionally, firearms
were seen in defendant's home during a drug sale."9 The Eleventh
Circuit noted that "[oince the government showed by a preponderance of
the evidence that the weapon was 'present at the site of the charged
conduct,' the burden shifted to [defendant] to demonstrate that a
connection between the firearms and the offense was 'clearly improbable. ' "'7 The court found that defendant failed to meet his burden and,
therefore, that the enhancement was not clearly erroneous. 7'
Likewise, in United States v. Hunter,72 the court upheld the Section
2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement based on a firearm that was found in
defendant's home, though defendant was arrested one hundred miles
from his home.7" The court held that although the firearm must be
"'present at the site of the charged conduct,'" such conduct includes
relevant conduct. 74 Noting that there was "ample evidence" to conclude
that defendant had used his home to distribute drugs, the court
concluded that the possession of the gun was relevant conduct for

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 application n.3.
190 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1256.
Id. (quoting United States v. Hall, 46 F.3d 62, 63 (11th Cir. 1995)).

71.

Id.

72.
73.
74.

172 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1309-10.
Id. at 1309 (quoting United States v. Cooper, 111 F.3d 845, 847 (11th Cir. 1997)).

The court rejected defendant's argument that, pursuant to Cooper, the enhancement
requires that the firearm be present at the site of the charged conduct. Id. The court
noted that the decision in Cooper had been clarified in United States v. Smith, 127 F.3d
1388 (11th Cir. 1997). 172 F.3d at 1309. In Smith the court held that a firearm
enhancement, pursuant to Section 2D1.1(b)(1), could be imposed whenever a firearm "is
possessed during conduct relevant to the offense of conviction." 127 F.3d at 1390.
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purposes of the application of the guideline enhancement.75 Thus, the
Section 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement can apply even in situations in which
the gun is not in the defendant's possession at the time of arrest.
In a similar vein, the Section 2D 1. 1(b)(1) enhancement can be applied
when the defendant is not the person possessing the firearm. In United
States v. Matthews,5 the Eleventh Circuit noted that the three relevant
factors needed to justify the Section 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement when a
coconspirator possesses a firearm were as follows: "(1) the actual
possessor is charged as a co-conspirator; (2) the co-conspirator possessed
the firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) the defendant who
receives the enhancement was involved in the conspiracy at the time of
the possession. " 77 The court found that the firearm enhancement
applied because four coconspirators possessed firearms during the course
of the conspiracy.78
In Matthews the court relied on United States v. Otero79 in articulating these three factors.8" About eight months later, the court was
again faced with a Section 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement based on a
coconspirator's possession of a gun. In United States v. Gallo,"' the
court cited Matthews as among the cases that had applied the Otero test
without discussing whether the coconspirator's possession of the firearm
was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. 82 The court noted that
Section 1B 1.3(a)(1)(B) was amended, effective November 1994, to provide
that the act of one coconspirator may be imputed to another coconspirator if that act was reasonably foreseeable and "'in furtherance of the
In interpreting the correct
jointly undertaken criminal activity.'""s
application of that guideline, the court held that
for a § 2D1.1(b)(1) firearms enhancement for co-conspirator possession
to be applied to a convicted defendant, the government must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the possessor of the firearm was
a co-conspirator, (2) the possession was in furtherance of the conspiracy, (3) the defendant was a member of the conspiracy at the time of the
possession, and (4) the co-conspirator possession was reasonably
foreseeable by the defendant."

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

172 F.3d at 1309-10.
168 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1248.
Id.
890 F.2d 366, 367 (11th Cir. 1989).
168 F.3d at 1248.
195 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1283.

83. Id. at 1283-84 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)).
84. Id. at 1284.
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Based on these criteria, the court vacated defendant's sentence and
remanded for a finding as to whether the coconspirator's possession of
the firearms was reasonably foreseeable to defendant.8" To the extent
that Otero and Matthews can be read as not requiring that the coconspirator's possession of a firearm must be reasonably foreseeable to the
defendant to justify a Section 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement, those cases are
no longer binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. 6
In addition to adding the reasonably foreseeable factor to the test set
forth in Matthews, the Gallo test is different in that it does not mention
the first Matthews factor: "the actual possessor is charged as a coconspirator." 7 The Gallo test merely requires that "the possessor of
the firearm was a co-conspirator," intimating that an uncharged
coconspirator would suffice. 8
In United States v. Gonzalez,89 the court addressed a coconspirator's
firearm possession in a slightly different context. Defendants' drug
conspiracy sentences were enhanced under Section 2D1.1(b)(1), even
though they were also convicted of using or carrying a firearm in
relation to a drug trafficking crime, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 90
Defendants challenged the Section 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement based on
United States v. Henderson,9 1 in which the Eleventh Circuit held that
a defendant's sentence could not be enhanced under Section 2D1. 1(b)(1)
if the defendant was also convicted under Section 924(c).92 The
Eleventh Circuit distinguished Henderson because defendant in that case
had no coconspirators." The court then held that, despite defendants'
Section 924(c) convictions, the district court did not err in enhancing
their sentences under Section 2D1.1(b)(1) based on the possession of
weapons by their coconspirator. 94

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 168 F.3d at 1248.
88. 195 F.3d at 1284.
89. 183 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 1999).
90. Id. at 1325.
91. 75 F.3d 614, 617 (11th Cir. 1996).

92. 183 F.2d at 1325.
93. Id. at 1326. The Eleventh Circuit noted that Henderson also stated that a Section
924(c) sentence was not "'dependent on the number of firearms used.'" Id. (quoting
Henderson, 75 F.3d at 618).
94. Id.; see also United States v. Rodriguez, 65 F.3d 932, 933 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding
a Section 924(c) sentence does not preclude an enhancement under U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.4
for a separate weapons possession by a coconspirator).
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c. U.S.S.G. Section 2D1.1(b)(2)-Enhancement for Use of an Aircraft. Section 2D1. 1(b)(2) provides for a two-level enhancement "[ilf the
defendant unlawfully imported or exported a controlled substance under
circumstances in which an aircraft other than a regularly scheduled
commercial air carrier was used to import or export the controlled
substance." Though no actual importation or use occurred in United
States v. Chastain,' the district court interpreted this guideline
broadly, relying on the terms "Attempt or Conspiracy" contained in the
title of Section 2D1.1. 7 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that
[w]hen the language of the guideline is clear, it is not necessary to look
elsewhere for interpretation. Here the language of the guideline
clearly contemplates a completed event, an actual importation. That
did not occur in this case. The court will not look to the title of a
guideline to explain what is quite clear in its text."8

4. Part F--Offenses Involving Fraud or Deceit
Loss calculations continue to pose significant questions at sentencing
and on appeal. For example, in United States v. Sigma International,
Inc.,99 defendants were charged with various crimes arising out of a
fraudulent scheme to adulterate frozen shrimp and distribute them in
interstate commerce. In calculating the loss from the offenses for
purposes of Section 2F1. 1, the district court included a loss that resulted
from conduct that was engaged in with the Government's approval." °
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the loss from such conduct could not
be included in the loss calculations "on the theory that [defendants]
would have committed a crime had they not been arrested."101 The
court explained, "[iut is a fundamental precept of criminal law that
people may only be sentenced for crimes they commit. Conversely, if

95. U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.1(b)(2).
96.

198 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 1999).

97. Id. at 1353.
98. Id.; see also United States v. Joelson, 7 F.3d 174, 180 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding
intent to use a private plane was not enough to support a Section 2D1.1(b)(2) enhancement).
99.

196 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 1999).

100. Id. at 1319, 1325. Before February 23, 1995, defendant washed the shrimp with
chlorine. After that date, the "washing" was not illegal because it was done without
chlorine and under State of Florida supervision. Id. at 1318, 1325.
101. Id. at 1325.
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conduct does not constitute a crime, people may not be punished for that
conduct." I02
The court in Sigma International,Inc. next found that the district
court chose the correct method for calculating the amount of loss under
Section 2F1.1, that is, the intended loss rather than the gain to
defendants.'l 3
"If the district court had calculated loss based on
[defendant's] profit, rather than on what [defendant] intended its victims
to lose, the court would have been crediting [defendant] for the material
required
to propagate its fraud."' ° That result would be "nonsensi05
cal."1
In Hedges v. United States,"° the court upheld loss calculations
based on the actual loss "[because the actual loss ($92 million) was
greater than the loss that [defendant] subjectively believed would result
from the scheme."'0° The court explained that defendant's "[k]nowledge is not necessarily relevant to the amount of loss that is attributed
to a defendant for sentencing purposes. " "
Application note 9 to Section 2F1.1 provides that "[tf]or the purposes
of subsection (b)(1), the loss need not be determined with precision. The
court need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss, given the
available information." I° 9 In United States v. Miller," the district
court estimated a portion of the loss in calculating defendant's sentence
for a fraudulent scheme involving letters of credit because documentation of the loss was missing and incomplete."' Although the district
court's estimation in this case may not have been precise, the Eleventh
Circuit found that it was reasonable
given the limited information
112
available to the sentencing court.
However, the fact that the district court may imprecisely estimate the
amount of loss does not alleviate the Government's burden of proving the
loss or the district court's responsibility to make specific factual findings.
In United States v. Cabrera,"' the Eleventh Circuit vacated defendant's sentence for fraudulent possession of cellular telephone cloning

102. Id.
103. Id. at 1326.
104. Id.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
175 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1316.
Id.
U.S.S.G § 2F1.1 application n.9.
188 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1316.
Id. at 1316-17.
172 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 1999).
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equipment, ruling that proof of defendant's mere possession of unauthorized cellular telephone numbers is insufficient to satisfy the Government's burden of providing reliable and specific evidence to support the
amount of fraud loss attributable to defendant." 4 The court clarified
that evidence derived from a "cell site analysis," which attempts to
identify the geographic area involved in the unlawful use of cellular
telephone access numbers, would not be appropriate when, as in this
case, the defendant was convicted not of unlawful use, but rather of
possessing equipment used to clone cellular telephones."'
The court then rejected the Government's argument that defendant
was liable for all fraud reported by cellular service providers for the
cellular telephone access numbers found on defendant's computer
software and hardware." 6 Instead, the court held that "telephone
cloning fraud loss is attributable to a defendant, and therefore can be
utilized to enhance the defendant's sentence, only if the government
provides reliable proof linking the defendant to the [access numbers]
fraudulently used."" 7 The Eleventh Circuit then remanded the case
for resentencing because the district court did not make specific factual
findings to support the loss amount."8

5. Part G-Offenses Involving Prostitution, Sexual Exploitation
of Minors, and Obscenity
As in recent years, 1999 saw offenses involving child pornography
continue to result in a broad interpretation of the guidelines and severe
sentences in the Eleventh Circuit. In a case of first impression, the
court in United States v. Garrett"9 was asked to determine whether
the enhancement found in Section 2G2.2(b)(2) is limited to distribution
of child pornography for pecuniary gain. Section 2G2.2(b)(2) provides,
"If the offense involved distribution, increase by the number of levels
from the table in § 2F1. 1 corresponding to the retail value of the
material, but in no event by less than 5 levels." 20 Defendant pleaded

114.
115.

Id. at 1292-94.
Id. at 1292.

116. Id. at 1293. The Eleventh Circuit rejected United States v. Clayton, 108 F.3d 1114
(9th Cir. 1997), to the extent that Clayton stands for "the proposition that the government
can attribute the entire fraud loss associated with [access numbers] to the defendant solely
because the defendant possessed those combinations." 172 F.3d at 1293.
117. 172 F.3d at 1293-94.
118. Id. at 1294.
119. 190 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 1999).
120. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(2).
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guilty to the offenses of sexual exploitation of a minor and transporting
child pornography. The district court enhanced his sentence under
Section 2G2.2(b)(2), finding that the offenses involved distribution of
pornography. Defendant argued that the enhancement requires that the
121
In
distribution involve pecuniary gain, which he did not receive.
1
to
note
application
on
relied
defendant
this
argument,
support of
act
any
includes
"'['d]istribution'
that
provides
which
2G2.2,
Section
related to distribution for pecuniary gain, including production,
'
' 22
The
transportation, and possession with intent to distribute. ""
the
that
holding
in
circuits
other
three
with
sided
Eleventh Circuit
pecuniary
for
to
distribution
not
limited
was
"distribution" enhancement
gain. 123 The court noted that defendant distributed pictures of sexual
acts between minors and adults to the minor victim to entice her to
engage in deviant sexual acts with him. 124 Therefore, the court held,
even though defendant did not distribute the pictures "for commercial
in order to receive what he considered to be
gain, he did distribute them
125
another 'valuable gain.'"'
In Garrettthe court also addressed the four-level enhancement under
Section 2G2.2(b)(3) for material depicting minors in sadistic and
masochistic or violent acts. 2 ' The guidelines do not define those
terms. Thus, the court was faced with another issue of first impression,
that is, whether photographs depicting minors engaged in acts that
would necessarily be painful to young children fit the criteria for
enhancement under Section 2G2.2(b)(3). 127 At defendant's sentencing
a doctor testified as an expert that the photographs depicted acts that
12
would necessarily have been painful to the young children involved.
129
Based on this testimony, the court upheld the enhancement.
In United States v. Miller,30 defendant appealed his sentence for
transporting and possessing computer disks containing visual depictions

121.
122.

190 F.3d at 1221, 1222.
Id. at 1222 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 application n.1) (alteration in original).

123. Id. at 1222-23 (citing United States v. Lorge, 166 F.3d 516, 518-19 (2d Cir. 1999);
United States v. Hibbler, 159 F.3d 233, 237-38 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Canada,
110 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 1997)). But see United States v. Black, 116 F.3d 198, 202-03
(7th Cir. 1997) (holding the enhancement is limited to transactions for pecuniary gain, but
includes "swaps, barter in-kind transactions, and other valuable consideration").
124. 190 F.3d at 1223.
125. Id. The court further found that the district court did not clearly err in finding
that defendant sent the pictures in an effort to seduce the minor victim. Id.
126. Id. at 1224.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 166 F.3d 1153 (11th Cir. 1999).
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of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. The sentencing court
used the cross-reference provision of Section 2G2.2(c)(1) to enhance his
guidelines by ten levels. 3' Section 2G2.2(c)(1) provides, "If the offense
involved causing, transporting, permitting, or offering or seeking by
notice or advertisement, a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct
for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of such conduct, apply
§ 2G2.1. "132 The Eleventh Circuit held that the term "offense" includes
both charged and uncharged offenses." 3 The court then found that the
uncharged conduct in this case had been established because defendant
acknowledged that conduct in the plea agreement."" Additionally, the
court held that by posting information on Internet newsgroups,
defendant's messages amounted to a "notice or advertisement" within the
meaning of the cross-reference.'35

6. Part J-Offenses Involving the Administration of Justice
In United States v. Magluta,3 6 the district court sentenced defendant to separate, consecutive sentences on bond-jumping charges and
false-identification charges. Defendant argued that under application
note 3 to Section 2J1.6, the district court was required to treat the bondjumping case as an upward adjustment for obstruction of justice in the
false-identification case, rather than as a separate case for sentencing
purposes.' 37 The commentary states, in pertinent part,
In the case of a conviction on both the underlying offense and the
failure to appear in court, the failure to appear is treated under
§ 3C1.1 (Obstruction or Impeding the Administration of Justice) as an
obstruction of the underlying offense, and the failure to appear count
and the count or counts
for the underlying offense are grouped together
8
under § 3D1.2(c)."1
The Government argued that the grouping rules conflicted with the
language of 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b), which requires a consecutive sentence

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 1154.
U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(c)(1).
166 F.3d at 1155.
Id.
Id. at 1156.
198 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated in part, 203 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2000).
198 F.3d at 1279.
U.S.S.G. -§ 2.1.6 application n.3.
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on a failure-to-appear charge.139 Although the Eleventh Circuit agreed
the district court may have erred by not following application note 3,
defendant did not raise this issue in the district court.1" Because
there was no case law directly dealing with the potential conflict
between the statute and the guideline, the court held that the possible
error did not constitute plain error.141
However, in Magluta the court agreed with defendant that the district
court erred in calculating his offense level under Section 2J1.6 for bail
jumping. 142 Section 2J1.6(b)(2) allows for a base offense level adjustment for bond jumping based on the statutory maximum sentence for
"the underlying offense" on which the defendant failed to appear.143
Although each of the ten underlying counts in this case carried a
statutory maximum sentence of five years, the district court based the
Section 2J1.6(b)(2) enhancement on the aggregate statutory maximum
of fifty years.'" The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the term
"underlying offense" is unambiguous as it describes "one offense, and
nothing more." 45 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Section
2J1.6(b)(2) enhancement must be based on "the most serious of the
counts referred to in the indictment-and not the aggregate of all the
maximum penalties in the counts."'"
7. Part K-Offenses Involving Public Safety
Several guideline provisions deal with firearms as specific offense
characteristics and as enhancements. 4 7 Section 2K2.1 deals with
specific firearms-related offenses, that is, unlawful receipt, possession,
or transportation of firearms or ammunition. Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A)
provides a base offense level of twenty for certain firearm offenses if the

139. 198 F.3d at 1280.
140. Id.
141.

Id.

142. Id. at 1280-81.
143. Under Section 2J1.6(b)(2), 6 levels are added to the base offense level if the
underlying offense is punishable by 5 to 15 years, and 9 levels are added if the underlying
offense is punishable by 15 years or more.

144. 198 F.3d at 1281.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1282. The court granted Magluta's petition for clarification to the extent
that he requested to "be allowed to argue on remand the subsequent amendment to the
Sentencing Guidelines, Amendment 579, that clarifies the application of§ 2J1.6." 203 F.3d
at 1305. The Eleventh Circuit then directed the district court to follow the amended
application note because the guideline was amended after sentence was imposed. Id.
147. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. §§ 2B3.1(b)(2), 2B5.1(b)(3), 2Dl.1(b)(1), 4B1.4(b)(3)(A).
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defendant "had one prior felony conviction of either a crime of violence
or a controlled substance offense."'
The circuits are split on the
meaning of "prior conviction" for purposes of this guideline. 49 In
United States v. Laihben,15 ° the court sided with the majority- of the
circuits, holding that "the sentencing court should consider sentences
imposed before the time of sentencing rather than before the time of the
federal offense." 5 ' Thus, even though defendant was not convicted
and sentenced in state court before he committed the instant federal
firearms crime, his state court conviction counted as a prior conviction
under Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). 152
Section 2K2.1(b)(5) provides a base offense level enhancement if a
defendant uses or possesses a gun with the knowledge, intent, or reason
to believe that the gun would be used in connection with another felony
offense. In United States v. Askew, 5 ' the district court applied this
enhancement to a defendant convicted of stealing guns from a licensed
dealer. The evidence established that defendant knew the stolen guns

148. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A).
149. The Sixth Circuit has found that the language of Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) is
unambiguous. See United States v. Barton, 100 F.3d 43, 45-46 (6th Cir. 1996). The Sixth
Circuit held that the words "had" and "prior" in that guideline only refer to felony
convictions occurring prior to the federal offense conduct. Id. However, the District of
Columbia, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have held the opposite. See United States v. Pugh,
158 F.3d 1308, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. Gooden, 116 F.3d 721, 724-25 (5th
Cir. 1997); United States v. McCary, 14 F.3d 1502, 1505-06 (10th Cir. 1994).
150. 167 F.3d 1364 (11th Cir. 1999).
151. Id. at 1366. In so holding the court looked to the commentary because it found
that the language of Section 2K2.1 was ambiguous. Id. Application note 5 to Section
2K2.1 cross-references application note 1 to Section 4B1.2 for the definition of "prior felony
conviction(s)" and states, "For the purposes of determining the number of such convictions
under subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(4)(A), count any such prior conviction that
receives any points under section 4A1.1." U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 application n.5. The Eleventh
Circuit referred to the commentary to Section 4A1.2, which defines "prior sentence" as a
"sentence imposed ... prior to sentencing on the instant offense.'" 167 F.3d at 1366
(quoting U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 application n.1). The Eleventh Circuit's reliance on the definition
of "prior sentence" found in application note 1 to Section 4A1.2 is particularly interesting
in light of the fact that the commentary to Section 2K2.1 cross-references Section 4B1.2 for
the definition of "prior felony conviction(s)." Id. Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit stated
that the language of application note 1 to Section 4A1.2 made its result "clear." Id.
152. 167 F.3d at 1365-66; cf United States v. Richardson, 166 F.3d 1360, 1361 (11th
Cir. 1999) (holding that "a conviction is 'previous' to a [18 U.S.C.] § 922(g) offense only if
the conviction occurred before the violation of § 922(g), not simply prior to conviction or
sentencing for that violation"); United States v. Rucker, 171 F.3d 1359, 1363-64 (11th Cir.
1999) (attributing a different meaning to the word "previous," as it is used in the Armed
Career Criminal Act); United States v. Walker, 198 F.3d 811, 812-13 (11th Cir. 1999)
(same).
153. 193 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 1999).
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would be sold, but he did not sell them or have knowledge of the
circumstances surrounding the anticipated sale.'54 The Eleventh
Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that if a defendant does not
actually sell the guns and has no knowledge of the circumstances
surrounding the sale, the court cannot infer that the defendant knew
how the buyers would use the firearms.' 5 The court explained that
the Government must prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that "the
non-seller knew or had reason to believe the guns would be used to
commit another felony." 156 In so holding the court reiterated that the
preponderance of the evidence standard is not a "toothless standard" and
that a sentencing court must ensure that the Government meets the
appropriate standard before enhancing a defendant's sentence.'
Thus, because the Government had not met its burden of proof, the
district court's finding that defendant had reason to believe the guns
would be used to commit a felony was clearly erroneous. 58
8. Part L-Offenses Involving Immigration, Naturalization, and
Passports
In two cases the court was called upon to interpret the aggravated
That guideline
felony enhancement under Section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A).
provides for a sixteen-level enhancement if the defendant was previously
deported after a criminal conviction for an aggravated felony. In United
States v. Simon,' the court held that the term "aggravated felony,"
as used in the guideline, included defendant's prior Florida felony
conviction for possessing cocaine, even though cocaine possession is not
a felony under federal law."' °

154. Id. at 1182-84.
155. Id. at 1184-85.
156. Id. at 1185.
157. Id. at 1183.
158. Id. at 1185. In this case the Government merely established that defendant stole
numerous guns, that the guns could be used for a variety of purposes, and that defendant
knew the guns were to be sold. Id. Although one possible purpose for the guns was illegal
(that is, that the guns would be used to commit a felony), there were other possible legal
purposes for the guns. Id. "Nothing in the record before the sentencing judge eliminated
these 'innocent' possibilities." Id.
159. 168 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1999).
160. Id. at 1272. Defendant argued that his prior Florida conviction for possession of
cocaine could not be classified as an aggravated felony because this offense, while a felony
under Florida law, was a misdemeanor under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), which provides that
simple possession of cocaine under federal law is a misdemeanor offense. Id. The court
noted that application note 1 to Section 2L1.2 provides that the term "aggravated felony,"
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5 the district court applied
In United States v. Alfaro-Zayas,"'
the
Section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) enhancement when the aggravated felony was a
prior drug conviction for selling twenty dollars worth of cocaine. In
moving for a downward departure, defendant argued that the prior drug
conviction should not be considered an aggravated felony under Section
2L1.2(b)(1)(A) "because it overstated the seriousness of his criminal
conduct."" 2 Eleventh Circuit precedent holds that Section 4A1.3
authorizes a downward departure when the defendant's criminal history
category does not reflect his past conduct, regardless of his status as a
career offender under Section 4B .1."
Defendant did not argue that
his criminal history did not reflect his past conduct. Rather, he argued
that his underlying drug conviction should not be considered an
aggravated felony under Section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) "because it overstated the
seriousness of his criminal conduct."' 4 The court rejected defendant's
argument, noting that "[iun the past, we have only applied § 4A1.3 'to a
pattern of criminal conduct, not to an individual crime.'"' 6 Thus, the
court found that Section 4A1.3 would not allow for a downward
departure on the basis that a prior drug conviction should not be
considered an aggravated felony under Section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A).
Nonetheless, the court noted that a downward departure may be
authorized under application note 5 to Section 2L1.2 if Section
2L1.2(b)(1)(A) applies and "'(A) the defendant has previously been
convicted of only one felony offense; (B) such offense was not a crime of
violence or firearms offense; and (C) the term of imprisonment imposed

as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), includes in its definition any drug-trafficking crime
as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Id. Section 924(c)(2), in turn, defines the term "drug
trafficking crime" to include "any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act

(21 U.S.C. § 801, et. seq.)." Id.
In arguing that his prior possession of cocaine was not an aggravated felony, defendant
pointed out that mere possession of cocaine is a misdemeanor under federal law. Id. The
Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument, noting that the Controlled Substances Act defines
a felony as "'any Federal or State offense classified by applicable Federal or State law as

a felony.'" Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 802(13) (1994)). Thus, the court held, because
defendant was convicted of a drug felony under Florida law, he had committed a felony for
purposes of Section 924(c)(2) and, therefore, was convicted of an aggravated felony,

requiring the sixteen-level enhancement as described in the immigration guidelines. Id.
161. 196 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
162. Id. at 1340.
163. Id. at 1340-41 (citing United States v. Webb, 139 F.3d 1390, 1395 (11th Cir.
1998)).
164. Id. at 1340.
165. Id. at 1341 (quoting United States v. Phillips, 120 F.3d 227, 232 (11th Cir. 1997)).
166. Id. at 1342.
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for such offense did not exceed one year.'"167 The presence of those
three factors indicates the case may not fall within the "heartland" of the

sentencing guidelines."

69

However, in the instant case, all three

factors were not present.
In United States v. Ortega-Torres,7 defendant appealed his sentence
for smuggling seven illegal aliens into the United States. 7' He argued

that because he smuggled all seven aliens at one time, rather than in
separate transactions, each of his convictions were part of one "violation"
of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 and that he should be sentenced accordingly.'72
Noting that this was an issue of first impression, the Eleventh Circuit

ruled that the penalties in Section 1324(a)(2) were intended to be
m for whom a
applied "'for each alien'
violation of the statute occurred.'
The court also held that the penalty provision of that
statute was not unconstitutionally vague, even though the requisite fiveyear minimum mandatory sentence exceeded the sentence provided by
the recent amendments to Section 2L1.1.'74 In so holding the court
relied on Section 5Gl.l(b), which provides that "'[wihere a statutorily
required minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the
applicable guideline range, the statutorily required minimum sentence
shall be the [G]uideline sentence.'"'75

167. Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 application n.5).
168. Id.
169. Id. The district court made no findings concerning any circumstances that would
remove the instant case from the "heartland" of Section 2L1.2(b1)A). Rather, the district
court expressed its disagreement with the policy choices underlying the sentencing

guidelines.

The district court correctly noted that it was not authorized to depart

downward based on its disagreement with the policy choices underlying the guidelines. Id.
at 1343-44.

170. 174 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 1999).
171. Defendant was convicted of one count per alien of violating 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(2)(B)(ii), and (a)(2)(B)(iii), as well as of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371. The
district court sentenced defendant to five years for aliens three through seven, relying on
the five-year minimal mandatory provision of Section 1324(aX2). On appeal defendant
argued that the minimum mandatory penalty provision of Section 1324(a)(2) was
unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous and that "the rule of lenity requires that his
sentence be vacated and he be resentenced solely on the basis of his applicable Guidelines
range under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1." 174 F.3d at 1200.
172. 174 F.3d at 1200.
173. Id. at 1200-01 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) (Supp. III 1997)).
174. Id. at 1201 n.2. These amendments were mandated by the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Id.
175. Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 5G1.L(b)).
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Laundering and Monetary Transaction

Defendant in United States v. Miranda7 ' was convicted of conspiracy and money laundering under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957.177
Section 2S1.1 provides for the offense level to be increased depending on
the value of the funds laundered in violation of Section 1956. The
Eleventh Circuit defined the term "funds," as used in Section 2S1.1, as
"funds that are used by the defendant in an unlawful monetary
transaction." 78 The court noted that defendant's culpability, pursuant
to the guidelines, was limited to the money laundered in violation of the
money laundering statutes. 179 The court then held that the money
involved in the transactions that predated the enactment of the money
laundering statutes was not laundered in violation of the statutes.'is
The court rejected the Government's argument that all money laundered
before the enactment of the statutes was relevant conduct, stating that
the argument "begs the question of how money could have been
laundered prior to the enactment of the statutes which prohibit money
laundering. " 1'

10. Part T-Offenses Involving Taxation
Section 2T1.1(a) provides for a base offense level for tax evasion and
filing a false statement at the "[1level from § 2T4.1 (Tax Table)
corresponding to the tax loss" or, if there is no tax loss, level six. 82
The term "tax loss" is defined in Section 2T1. 1(c)(1) as "the total amount
of loss that was the object of the offense (i.e., the loss that would have
resulted had the offense been successfully completed)." 183 In United
States v. Hunerlach,14 the district court included interest and penal-

176. 197 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 1999).
177. Id. at 1358.

178. Id. at 1361 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Barrios,
993 F.2d 1522, 1524 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562, 575 (10th
Cir. 1992).

179. 197 F.3d at 1361.
180. Id.

181. Id.
182. U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1(a).
183. Id. § 2T1.1(c)(1).
184. 197 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 1999).
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ties in calculating defendant's tax loss.'85 The Eleventh Circuit found
that the plain language of Section 2T1.1(c) was ambiguous in that 18it6
could be read to include or not to include interest and penalties.
However, the court found that the commentary resolved the ambiguity.187 Application note 1 to Section 2T1.1 provides, in pertinent part,
"The tax loss does not include interest or penalties."'
11. Part X-Other Offenses: Conspiracies
Section 2X1.1(a) provides that the base offense level for attempts,
solicitations, or conspiracies, which are not covered by a specific offense
guideline, is determined by "[tihe base offense level from the guideline
for the substantive offense, plus any adjustments from such guideline for
any intended offense conduct that can be established with reasonable

certainty."' 9 In the case of conspiracies, Section 2X1.1(b)(2) provides
for a three-level downward adjustment
unless the defendant or a conspirator completed all the acts the
conspirators believed necessary on their part for the successful completion of the substantive offense or the circumstances demonstrate that
the conspirators were about to complete all such acts but for apprehension or interruption by some similar event beyond their control. 0

In United States v. DiGiorgio,'9' the Eleventh Circuit held that the
downward adjustment did not apply because the district court found
defendants would have completed the acts, "'but for apprehension or
interruption by some similar event beyond their control.'"'92

185. Id. at 1064.
186. Id. at 1069-70.
187. Id. at 1070.
188. U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1 application n.1. In holding that interest and penalties could not
be included in calculating the tax loss for Section 2T1.1 purposes, the court rejected the
Government's argument that such a holding would conflict with 26 U.S.C. § 6601(e), which
states that "'any reference in this title... to any tax imposed by this title shall be deemed
also to refer to interest imposed by this section on such tax.'" 197 F.3d at 1070 n.15
(quoting 26 U.S.C. § 6601(e)(1) (1994)). The Eleventh Circuit found no conflict between
Section 2Tl.1 and the Internal Revenue Code "[slince imposition of a tax is wholly
independent from the imposition of a sentence for evasion thereof." Id.
189. U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(a).
190. Id. § 2X1.1(b)(2).
191. 193 F.3d 1175 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
192. Id. at 1178 n.3 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(b)(2)).

1212

C.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

Chapter Three: Adjustments

1. Part A-Victim-Related Adjustments
The vulnerability of a victim193 and restraint of a victim' 94 are two
of the victim-related adjustments contained in Part A of Chapter Three.
The court upheld both adjustments in United States v. Gonzalez,' 95 in
which defendant pointed a gun at a child's head and threatened the life
of a seventy-two-year-old woman to obtain information, drugs, and
money from another person.'
The Eleventh Circuit stated, "The
applicability of the vulnerable-victim enhancement must be determined
on a case-by-case basis, and is appropriate where the defendant knows
the victim has 'unique characteristics' that make the victim more
vulnerable to the crime than other potential victims of the crime."'9 7
Although case law required that a defendant "target" his victim, 9 ' the
recent amendment to the commentary of Section 3A1.1 clarified that
section to allow for such an enhancement even if a defendant did not
"target" his victim. 9 The amended note provides that Section 3A1.1(b) "applies to offenses involving an unusually vulnerable victim in
which the defendant knows or should have known of the victim's
unusual vulnerability.""
This commentary is binding on the
court.2 ' The court rejected defendant's argument that a Section 3A1.1
enhancement does not apply in a drug conspiracy case.20 2 The court

193. The guidelines provide for a two-level increase "[ifthe defendant knew or should
have known that a victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim." U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b).
194. The guidelines provide for a two-level enhancement "[i]f a victim was physically
restrained in the course of the offense." U.S.S.G. § 3A1.3.
195. 183 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 1999).
196. Id. at 1327.
197. Id. at 1326.
198. Id. (citing United States v. Page, 69 F.3d 482, 488 (11th Cir. 1995); United States
v. Long, 935 F.2d 1207, 1210 (11th Cir. 1991)). In United States v. Rudisill, 187 F.3d 1260
(11th Cir. 1999), the court held that the record contained sufficient facts to support the
district court's finding that it was reasonably foreseeable to defendant that elderly victims
were targeted in the telemarketing scheme, based on defendant's degree of involvement in
the conspiracy and the finding that defendant knew the scope of the criminal activity. Id.
at 1268-69.
199. 183 F.3d at 1326.
200. U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1 application n.2 (listing the applicable characteristics as "age,
physical or mental condition, or [one] who is otherwise particularly susceptible to the
criminal conduct").
201. See United States v. Rodriguez, 65 F.3d 932, 933 n.1 (11th Cir. 1995).
202. 183 F.3d at 1326.
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further noted that in applying a vulnerable-victim enhancement, "[tihe
district court must look not only at the victim's individual vulnerability,
but also at the totality of the circumstances, including the status of the
victim and the nature of the crime."20 3
In Gonzalez the court also upheld a two-level enhancement under
Section 3A1.3 for restraint of a victim.2" Physical restraint is defined
in application note 1(i) to Section 1B1.1 as "forcible restraint of the
victim such as by being tied, bound, or locked up."2 °5 The Eleventh
Circuit explained that being "tied, bound, or locked up" were examples
of physical restraint, rather than limitations on the meaning on physical
restraint. 206 The court then found that by holding the
victims at
20 7
gunpoint, defendants physically restrained those

victims.

In United States v. Hidalgo,2° the district court applied the restraint-of-victim enhancement when the victim was a coconspirator. 209
The Eleventh Circuit stated that the enhancement applied when "any
victim, co-conspirator or otherwise" was restrained.2 1 °
2. Part B-Role in the Offense
The guidelines provide for various adjustments depending on the
defendant's role in the offense. These guidelines were the subject of
several significant decisions in 1999.
a. U.S.S.G. Section 3B1.1-AggravatingRole. Section 3B1.1 provides
for three guideline enhancements of increasing severity depending on the
extent of a defendant's aggravating role in an offense.2" The court

203. Id. at 1327.
204. Id.

205. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 application n.1.
206. 183 F.3d at 1327.
207. Id.
208. 197 F.3d 1108 (11th Cir. 1999).
209. Id. at 1109.
210. Id.
211. Section 3B1.1 provides,
Based on the defendant's role in the offense, increase the offense level as follows:
(a) If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that
involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 4 levels.
(b) If the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or
leader) and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was
otherwise extensive, increase by 3 levels.
(c) If the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any
criminal activity other than described in (a) or (b), increase by 2 levels.
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1.
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applied the most significant enhancement (four levels) in United States
v. Gonzalez,212 in which the court found defendant was an organizer or
leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants." 3
The Eleventh Circuit held the district court did not err in applying the
Section 3B1.1(a) enhancement in light of evidence of defendant's
involvement in a drug conspiracy and a home invasion, as well as
evidence that he contacted the informant about the drug importation and
distribution scheme.2 14
In United States v. Matthews,215 the district court applied the threelevel enhancement found in Section 3B1.1(b) "for being a manager or
supervisor of at least one other person in a criminal organization that
involved five or more participants." 2 6 The Eleventh Circuit found that
defendant's criminal activity (which included fronting and selling drugs
to numerous runners, who would then sell drugs and return the profit
to defendant) justified the enhancement. 217 Defendant argued that the
enhancement did not apply because he did not have control over the
others "or the power to force them to engage in criminal acts."21 s The
Eleventh Circuit ruled that this argument misinterpreted the relevant
inquiry, as control over coconspirators is not required. 2 9 The court
noted that in a drug distribution case, "the management enhancement
is appropriate for a defendant who arranges drug transactions,
negotiates sales with others, and hires others to work for the conspiracy."

220

Section 3B1.1(c) provides for a two-level enhancement "[i]f the
defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any
criminal activity other than described in (a) or (b)."221 The district
court in United States v. Shazier222 applied the enhancement, finding
that defendant was "some sort of leader."223 The Eleventh Circuit
determined the enhancement was appropriate based on coconspirators'
statements indicating they were recruited by, and were delivering drugs

212. 183 F.3d 1315 (11th Ci.. 1999).
213. Id. at 1325.
214. Id.
215. 168 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 1999).
216. Id. at 1249.
217. Id. at 1249-50.

218. Id. at 1250.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1249.
221.

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c).

222. 179 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 1999).
223. Id. at 1320.
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for, defendant. 2" These statements supported the court's decision that
defendant supervised or managed the coconspirators' activities.225
The question of whether the defendant's control over assets of the
offense qualified him for the aggravating-role enhancement was the
subject of two cases before the Eleventh Circuit in 1999. In United States
v. Glover, 6 the district court applied the Section 3B1.1(c) enhancement because defendant had control over the drugs, which were an asset
of the organization. 227
Finding the enhancement improper, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the Section 3B1.1 enhancement cannot "be
based solely2 on a finding that defendant managed the assets of a
conspiracy."

1

Similarly, in United States v. Harness,2 9 the sentencing court
imposed a Section 3B1.1(c) aggravating-role enhancement because
defendant had responsibility over the property and assets of the victim.
Defendant, an accountant employed by the Red Cross, was convicted of
illegal diversion of federal funds intended to benefit needy individuals
facing eviction from their homes.23 ° The Eleventh Circuit reversed,
holding that the enhancement requires a defendant to "organize, lead,
231
manage, or supervise another participant in the criminal scheme."
The court held the error was plain and required resentencing even in the
absence of a defense objection at sentencing because defendant was
sentenced to the high end of the applicable guideline range.2 32
b. U.S.S.G. Section 3B1.2-MitigatingRole. In a landmark decision
that has meant the death of the minor-role adjustment in many cases,
the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated the panel decision in
United States v. Rodriguez De Varon.23 Counsel having questions
about role reductions will find this case an appropriate place to start.
The court discussed the three types of reductions available pursuant to

224. Id.
225. Id. The Eleventh Circuit also rejected defendant's contention that his right to due
process was violated because he was not informed of the factual basis for the enhancement.
Id. The court found this contention was "belied by the fact that counsel was provided, and
objected to, the pre-sentence report on which the government based its recommendation"
for a role enhancement. Id.
226. 179 F.3d 1300 (l1th Cir. 1999).
227. Id. at 1302-03.
228. Id. at 1303. The court noted, though, that asset management may support an
upward departure. Id. at 1302; see also U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 application n.2.
229. 180 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 1999).
230. Id. at 1233-34.
231. Id. at 1235.
232. Id.
233. 175 F.3d 930 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc), vacating 136 F.3d 740 (11th Cir. 1998).
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Section 3B1.2, noting that as "proponent of the downward adjustment
[the defendant] always bears the burden of proving a mitigating role...
by a preponderance of the evidence."23
In determining whether a person qualifies for a minor-role reduction,
the court explained,
Notwithstanding our deference to the district court's discretion in this
uniquely fact-intensive inquiry, the district court's ultimate determination of the defendant's role in the offense should be informed by two
principles discerned from the Guidelines: first, the defendant's role in
the relevant conduct for which she has been held accountable at
sentencing, and, second, her role as compared to that of other participants in her relevant conduct."'

The court further noted that a defendant's role may not be determined
on the basis of criminal conduct for which she was not held accountable
at sentencing.23
In looking at relevant conduct in a drug courier
context, the sentencing court could consider any fact related to a
defendant's conduct as a courier in an importation scheme, such as her
status and assigned tasks in that scheme and the amount of drugs
imported." 7 However, the court stated, "Only if the defendant can
establish that she played a relatively minor role in the conduct for which

she has already been held accountable-not a minor role in any larger
criminal conspiracy-should the district court grant a downward
adjustment for minor role in the offense."2"
Concerning the defendant's role as compared to other participants in
the relevant conduct, the court noted that "not all participants may be
relevant to this inquiry." "' The sentencing court should only consider
participants who are identifiable or discernable from the evidence and
who are involved in the relevant conduct attributed to the defendant.24 °
The court reaffirmed that a district court's determination of a
defendant's role is a finding of fact to be reviewed only for clear

234. 175 F.3d at 939.
235. Id. at 940. The court also explained that it is preferable, but not necessary, for
the district court to clarify its ultimate factual finding by making specific subsidiary factual
findings. Id. at 939. The district court is only required to make specific factual findings
as to the final determination of the defendant's role. Id. at 940.
236. Id. at 940.
237. Id. at 942.
238. Id. at 944.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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error.241 The en banc court held that the district court did not clearly
err in determining that defendant did not play a minor role in relevant
conduct of heroin importation.242
In United States v. Matthews,24 two defendants were classified as
minor participants under Section 3B1.2(b), but argued that they should
have been classified as minimal participants under Section 3B1.2(a).24
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed based on defendants' "extensive
The court noted that in
involvement in numerous transactions."'
considering a drug distribution conspiracy, the district court may refuse
a minimal-role reduction for any defendant "who regularly sells or
purchases drugs" or who "serves as a liaison between other co-conspirators or arranges transactions.""
The court also rejected a third defendant's claim that he should have
been classified as a minor participant because his involvement in the
conspiracy was primarily for personal use rather than distribution.24 7
The Eleventh Circuit found the district court did not err in finding this
defendant was not among the less culpable defendants based on evidence
that he accompanied a coconspirator on numerous substantial drug
purchases.2 *
In United States v. Cataldo,249 the district court denied defendant's
motion for a mitigating-role reduction, indicating that a "broker," such
as defendant, would almost never have an aggravating or mitigating role
in an organization. 2' The district court further indicated that brokers
"are a classic example of somebody who deserves whatever the standard
level is in the sense that they don't get any increase in levels and they
don't get any decrease in levels. I see nothing in the circumstances of
this case to depart either upward or downward." 251

On appeal

defendant contended that the court applied a per se rule that excluded

241. Id. at 938.
242. Id. at 945-46. Likewise, in United States v. Campbell, 181 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir.
1999), the Eleventh Circuit held that "[i]t was not improper for the district court to rely on
factors relating to defendant's status as a drug courier in denying her a minor role

adjustment." Id. at 1264.
243. 168 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 1999).
244. Id. at 1249. Pursuant to Section 3B1.2(b), a minor participant is entitled to a twolevel reduction. Pursuant to Section 3B1.2(a), a minimal participant is entitled to a four-

level reduction.
245. Id.
246. Id.
.247. Id.
248. Id.
249. 171 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 1999).
250. Id. at 1319.
251. Id.
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brokers from being eligible for a mitigating-role adjustment, whereas the
application of a mitigating-role guideline requires an inquiry into the
specific facts of each case.252 The Eleventh Circuit, however, held that
the district court's comments were merely a "rough guide," which was
then applied to the particular facts of defendant's case."' Because the
district court ultimately made the decision based on "'the circumstances
of this case,'" the court held that the district court properly rejected
defendant's request for a mitigating-role adjustment. 2 "
c. U.S.S.G. Section 3B1.3-Abuse of a Position of Trust or Use of
Special Skill. Section 3B1.3 provides for a two-level enhancement "[ilf
the defendant abused a position of public or private trust, or used a
special skill, in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission
or concealment of the offense." 255 The Eleventh Circuit addressed the
abuse-of-trust enhancement in United States v. Harness.2" The court
observed that because defendant failed to object to the conclusory
statement in the PSR identifying the Red Cross as the victim, the
sentencing court could rely on the statement.257 Given that factual
premise, defendant abused a position of trust because he was a director
of the Red Cross program from which he was diverting money for
personal use.25 '
The "special skill" enhancement was at issue in United States v.
Chastain.259 The guideline commentary defines "special skill" as any
"skill not possessed by members of the general public and usually
requiring substantial education, training or licensing. Examples would
include pilots, lawyers, doctors, accountants, chemists, and demolition
Defendant, a pilot charged with narcotic offenses in
experts."2"
connection with the attempted importation of marijuana, argued that his
sentence could not be enhanced under Section 3B1. 1 because his special
skill-flying airplanes-was a hobby, not a profession. 261' The court
rejected this argument, noting that the commentary does not distinguish
between professionals and amateurs.26 2

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1319-20.
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3.
180 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1236.
Id. at 1236-37.
198 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 1999).
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 application n.3.
198 F.3d at 1352-53.
Id. at 1353.
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3. Part C--Obstruction
Part C of Chapter Three of the guidelines contains enhancements for
obstructing the administration of justice and reckless endangerment
during flight. The court devoted considerable attention to both
enhancements in 1999.
a. U.S.S.G. Section 3C1.1--Obstructingor Impeding the Administration ofJustice. The obstruction-of-justice enhancement found in Section
3C1.1 has been applied to a variety of acts.2" In United States v.
Witherell,26 the Eleventh Circuit upheld an obstruction enhancement
for a defendant who violated her pretrial release by failing to report to
drug counseling and to her pretrial release officer.26 The court held
that defendant's actions obstructed the proceedings because a magistrate
judge had to entertain the petition revoking her release, the marshal
had to take her into custody, and a second magistrate judge had to hold
a preliminary revocation hearing and an additional detention hearing.2" The court concluded that "[b]y taxing the court time of the
magistrate judges in this way, [defendant] prevented these judges from
attending to other judicial business and therefore impeded the administration of justice."267
In United States v. Rudisill, 2' defendant learned that a codefendant
had been served with a grand jury subpoena to provide fingerprints and
handwriting exemplars. Because defendant was concerned that the
codefendant would cooperate with the police, he encouraged the
codefendant to become a fugitive and gave him cash. Based on these
acts, the district court enhanced defendant's offense level for obstruction
of justice.26 9 In upholding the enhancement, the Eleventh Circuit
noted that avoiding arrest, alone, does not warrant an enhancement for

263. Section 3C1.1 provides,
If (A)the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or
impede, the administration of justice during the course of the investigation,
prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and (B) the

obstructive conduct related to (i) the defendant's offense of conviction and any
relevant conduct; or (ii) a closely related offense, increase the offense level by 2
levels.
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
264. 186 F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 1999).
265. Id. at 1344-45.
266. Id. at 1345.
267. Id.
268. 187 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 1999).
269. Id. at 1263-64.
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obstruction.27 ° However, urging and aiding another to flee from the
police can form the basis for such an enhancement.2 7 The Eleventh
Circuit also noted that because the codefendant deliberately refused to
comply with a grand jury subpoena, defendant's role amounted to
"'concealing or directing or procuring another person to ... conceal
evidence that is material to an official investigation,'" thereby warranting the enhancement.2 72
The guidelines also provide for an obstruction enhancement when a
defendant "provid[es] materially false information to a probation officer
in respect to a presentence or other investigation."273 In United States
v. Cataldo,274 the district court applied the Section 3C1.1 enhancement
when defendant failed to acknowledge a 1983 out-of-state arrest when
asked about his arrest history during the preparation of the PSR.
Defendant argued that although he did not mention the offense, he made
no false statement because he was not arrested on the 1983 charge. At
the sentencing hearing, the probation officer presented court records
showing that defendant had an arraignment date on his prior conviction,
but not an arrest date. In imposing the enhancement, the district court
inferred that defendant had been arrested because he was sentenced to
probation. 275 The Eleventh Circuit reversed the enhancement, holding
that "[a]lthough the court's inference may be reasonable, courts 'must
not speculate concerning the existence of a fact
which would permit a
27
more severe sentence under the guidelines.'"
In United States v. Hitt,277 the court affirmed the obstruction-ofjustice enhancement based on defendant's false statements regarding his
ownership of real estate made during an indigency hearing, as well as
his statement to a Veterans Administration employee that he "would like
to blow [the investigating FBI agent's] brains out."278 Additionally, the
district court in United States v. Magluta27 9 imposed an obstruction
enhancement based on documents revealing defendant had enlisted
friends and family to help him remain a fugitive.28 0 In affirming the
enhancement, the Eleventh Circuit held that defendant's "conduct of

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Id. at 1264.
Id.
Id. at 1265 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 application n.3(d)).
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 application n.4(h).
171 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 1999).

275. Id. at 1320-21.
276. Id. at 1321 (quoting United States v. Wilson, 993 F.2d 214, 218 (11th Cir. 1993)).
277. 164 F.3d 1370 (11th Cir. 1999).
278. Id. at 1371.
279. 198 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated in part, 203 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2000).
280. 198 F.3d at 1282-83.

20001

SENTENCING GUIDELINES

1221

enlisting his friends and family members to help him remain a fugitive"
was "classic obstructive conduct," rather than conduct inherent in the
crime of failure to appear.2"'
The court also upheld obstruction enhancements in two cases based on
the defendant's false testimony at trial. In United States v. Gregg,28 2
defendant challenged the obstruction enhancement, arguing that "the
[trial] court erred in finding that his false testimony was willful, rather
than the result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory."2 3 The
district court found that defendant's trial testimony was "opposed to" the
testimony of another witness and that it was unbelievable and "incredible."2 4 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the finding was
supported by the record and that the district court's credibility determinations were accorded great deference. 2" The court also stated that
"because defendant failed to request more detailed findings
' 2of perjury at
sentencing, '[i]t is too late now to complain in this court. " 11
In United States v. Diaz,"7 defendant argued that the district court
erred in imposing an obstruction enhancement because it did not make
an independent factual finding that he had willfully lied during
trial. 2m Rather, defendant asserted, the district court "merely relied
upon the inference created by the jury's verdict."289 The Eleventh
Circuit rejected this argument, stating that "[a]lthough it is preferable
that the district court make specific findings by identifying the
materially false statements individually, it is sufficient if the court
makes a general finding of obstruction encompassing all the factual
predicates of perjury." '
b. U.S.S.G. Section 3C1.2-Reckless EndangermentDuringFlight. In
United States v. Matos-Rodriguez,29" a jury convicted defendant of
counterfeiting offenses, but acquitted him of assaulting a secret service

281. Id. at 1283.
282. 179 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 1999).
283. Id. at 1316. Application note 2 of Section 3C1.1 provides that "the court should
be cognizant that inaccurate testimony or statements sometimes may result from confusion,

mistake, or faulty memory and, thus, not all inaccurate testimony or statements
necessarily reflect a willful attempt to obstruct justice." U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 application n.2.
284. 179 F.3d at 1316.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1317 (quoting United States v. Geffrard, 87 F.3d 448, 453 (11th Cir. 1996))
(alteration in original).

287. 190 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 1999).
288. Id. at 1256.
289. Id.
290. Id.

291.

188 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 1999).
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agent with a dangerous weapon. Nevertheless, the district court
enhanced his sentence under Section 3A1.2(b) for assaulting a law
enforcement officer with an automobile (the acquitted conduct) and
under Section 3C1.2 for reckless endangerment during flight. 2 In
determining whether -this scoring constituted impermissible "double
counting," the Eleventh Circuit noted application note 1 to Section
3C1.2, which provides, "'Do not apply this enhancement where the
offense guideline in Chapter Two, or another adjustment in Chapter
Three [e.g., § 3A1.2(b)], results in an equivalent or greater increase in
offense level solely on the basis of the same conduct.'""3 The court
stated that if the enhancements under Section 3A1.2(b) and Section
3C1.2 were imposed "'solely on the basis of the same conduct,'" double
counting was impermissible. 2" However, the court found that the
assault of the agent with defendant's car "was separated temporally and
spatially from his subsequent, reckless conduct in leading police officers
on a high speed chase. This was not a single, uninterrupted event."" 5
Therefore, double counting was permissible. 2
In United States v. Sawyer,97 the Eleventh Circuit vacated the
district court's application of Section 3C1.2 because defendant did not
"'recklessly create[] a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury

292. Id. at 1301, 1309.
293. Id. at 1309-10 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 application n.1) (emphasis added by
court) (alteration in original). "'Double counting during sentencing is permissible if the
Sentencing Commission intended the result, and if the result is permissible because each
section concerns conceptually separate notions related to sentencing.'" Id. at 1310 (quoting
United States v. Adeleke, 968 F.2d 1159, 1161 (11th Cir. 1992)). The Sentencing
Commission is presumed to have intended double counting unless it specifically directed
otherwise. Id.
294. Id. at 1310 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 application n.1).
295. Id. at 1312.
296. Id. In so holding the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Fourth Circuit's opinion in
United States v. Sloley, 19 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 1994), which held that "'[i]f both § 3A1.2(b)
and § 3C1.2 apply to a defendant, the court must apply only the former and increase the
offense level by three levels.'" Id. at 1310 (quoting Sloley, 19 F.3d at'154) (alteration in
original).
297. 180 F.3d 1319 (l1th Cir. 1999). This case was the result of defendant's second
appeal of his sentence for armed bank robbery and possession of a firearm during a violent
crime. In his first appeal, the court concluded that the district court erred in applying
Section 3C1.2, the reckless endangerment adjustment. However, contrary to the mandate,
on remand the district court reinstated the reckless endangerment adjustment. Id. at
1321-22. The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis in the second case by noting that "[u]nder
the Guidelines, the crime and the criminal's characteristics are consulted, but the weight
to be given various considerations are programed; the Guidelines trump judicial
evaluation." Id. at 1322.
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to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement
Rather, defendant was pursued by, and fired his gun at,
officer.'"29
The court noted
several bank customers when he fled the bank.2
that Section 3C1.2 specifically applies to recklessly endangering law
°
enforcement officers, not customers or other persons.3" Nonetheless,
the court noted that on remand the district court could consider an
upward adjustment under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) because shooting at
nonofficer citizens appeared "to be an 'aggravating ... circumstance'
that the Sentencing Commission did not 'adequately take into consideration... in formulating' the Guidelines."3 0 l
4. Part D-Multiple Counts
Section 3D1.2 provides that closely related counts-that is, counts
"involving substantially the same harm"-are to be grouped for
sentencing purposes. 2 The guideline then describes four situations
in which counts involve substantially the same harm. The Eleventh
Circuit addressed two of these situations in 1999.
Section 3D1.2(a) provides for grouping "[w]hen counts involve the
same victim and the same act or transaction."30 3 The commentary
explains that the victim is the person "directly and most seriously
affected by the offense," but that society is considered the victim if there
30
is no identifiable victim.304 In United States v. Tillmon, the court
rejected defendant's claim that grouping was required because the same
victim was involved in all three counts of transporting a depiction of a
minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct and one count of soliciting a
minor for a sex act. 3' The court held, as have a majority of circuits,
that "the minor depicted in child pornography is the primary victim of
"3
In so holding, the Eleventh
01
the offense for purposes of grouping.
Circuit rejected the minority view that although the primary victim of

298. Id. at 1322 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2).
299. Id.

300. Id.
301.
302.

Id. at 1323 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994)).
U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2.

303. Id. § 3D1.2(a).
304.

Id. § 3D1.2 application n.2.

305.

195 F.3d 640 (11th Cir. 1999).

306. Id. at 641-44.
307. Id. at 643 (citing United States v. Hibbler, 159 F.3d 233, 237 (6th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Norris, 159 F.3d 926, 930 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Boos, 127 F.3d
1207, 1210 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Ketcham, 80 F.3d 789, 793 (3d Cir. 1996);
United States v. Rugh, 968 F.2d 750, 756 (8th Cir. 1992)).
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the offense of transporting a minor is the minor child, the primary
victim of the offense of transporting child pornography is society in
general. 8 '
The court also rejected defendant's argument that the production of
child pornography and the dissemination of the images have different
victims. 30 9 Defendant argued that while the minor depicted was
victimized when the photograph was taken, the transportation of the
photographs did not further harm that minor. Therefore, society, rather
than the minor, was the most directly and seriously affected by the
transportation of the pornography.310 The court disagreed, noting that
[although an argument can be made that the production of child
pornography may be more immediately harmful to the child involved,
the dissemination of that material certainly exacerbates that harm, not
only by constituting a continuing invasion of privacy but by providing
the very market that led to the creation of the images in the first
place."
Next, defendant argued that because there was no evidence from
which the minors in the pictures could be identified, there was no
identifiable victim for purposes of Section 3D1.2. s12 The court found
that the guidelines did not require the victim actually be named:
"Rather, it is sufficient that a specific victim can be
shown, whether or
313
not the court knows that victim's actual identity."
The grouping question presented in United States v. McClendon3 14
involved Section 3D1.2(d), which provides that counts involve substantially the same harm
[w]hen the offense level is determined largely on the basis of the total
amount of harm or loss, the quantity of a substance involved, or some

308. Id. at 643-44 (citing United States v. Toler, 901 F.2d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 1990)).
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. Defendant also argued that some of the minors depicted could be the same
child and that "therefore there may not be three different minor victims." Id. The
Eleventh Circuit noted that defendant did not object on this ground in the district court.
Id. at 644-45. Thus, reversal would be warranted only if the failure to do so would result
in manifest injustice. Id. at 645. The court noted that at sentencing defense counsel
indicated the pictures could have involved the same child, but did not file a written
objection to the PSR that stated, "'[M]inor victim depicted is different in each count.'" Id.
The Eleventh Circuit then noted that defendant had not presented any evidence contrary
to the district court's finding that the minor victims were different. Id. Therefore, the
court found that no plain error had occurred. Id.
314. 195 F.3d 598 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
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other measure of aggregate harm, or if the offense behavior is ongoing

or continuous in nature and the offense guideline is written to cover
such behavior.316
Section 3D1.2(d) then lists offenses that are to be grouped, as well as
offenses that are specifically excluded from grouping, and directs that
other offenses should be determined on a case-by-case basis. Defendant
pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit mail fraud and money laundering.31 The relevant fraud guideline 17 and money laundering guideline318 are listed as offenses that are to be grouped under Section
3D1.2(d). However, the Eleventh Circuit stated that the mere listing of
these offenses as offenses that are to be grouped does not automatically
require grouping.319

The court relied on application note 6 to Section 3D1.2, which provides
that "'[c]ounts involving offenses to which different offense guidelines
apply are grouped together under subsection (d) if the offenses are of the
same general type and otherwise meet the criteria for grouping under
this subsection.' 3 20 Although the fraud and money laundering charges
"otherwise [met] the criteria for grouping," the court proceeded to
determine that those offenses were not closely related under the
particular facts of this case. 21 The court noted that "the main connection between the laundered funds and the fraud scheme in this case is
that the money represented the proceeds of the fraud."3 22 To find that
grouping was required based solely on this connection would "'mean that
every act of money laundering would be closely related to the underlying

315.

U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d).

316.
317.

195 F.3d at 598-99.
U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1.

318. Id. § 2S1.2.
319. 195 F.3d at 601. The court noted that the circuits are split on the issue of whether
to group fraud and money laundering offenses under Section 3D1.2(d). Id. at 601 n.4.
Compare United States v. Landerman, 167 F.3d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1999) (grouping is
appropriate); United States v. Emerson, 128 F.3d 557, 565 (7th Cir. 1997) (same); United
States v. Wilson, 98 F.3d 281, 283 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Leonard, 61 F.3d

1181, 1186 (5th Cir. 1995) (same), with United States v. Napoli, 179 F.3d 1, 7 (2d Cir.
1999) (grouping is not appropriate); United States v. Kneeland, 148 F.3d 6, 16 (1st Cir.
1998) (same); United States v. O~ane, 155 F.3d 969, 974 (8th Cir. 1998) (same); United
States v. Taylor, 984 F.2d 298, 303 (9th Cir. 1993) (same); United States v. Johnson, 971
F.2d 562, 576 (10th Cir. 1992) (same).

320.

195 F.3d at 602 (quoting U.S.S.G § 3D1.2 application n.6).

321.

Id.

322. Id. The court further noted that the laundered money was not used to lure new
victims into the scheme and was not a key to preventing the discovery of the scheme. Id.
Rather, it was funneled into business accounts or withdrawn for personal use. Id.
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crime which produced the money to be laundered.'"323 According to the
Eleventh Circuit, this result was not contemplated by the guidelines.32 4
Therefore, the court upheld the district court's decision not to group the
counts in this case.325
5. Part E-Acceptance of Responsibility
The Eleventh Circuit has been fairly consistent in affirming district
court decisions to reject an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. The
only exception in 1999 was made when the district court misunderstood
the law. In rejecting defendant's request for a two-level reduction for
acceptance of responsibility, the district court in United States v.
Wilson121 told defendant, "I don't know of any law that would allow me
to be more lenient on you than I am." 27 The Eleventh Circuit found
that this was a misstatement of the law.3 2' The district court did have
authority to reduce defendant's guidelines if he accepted responsibility
for his actions, even though defendant was convicted following a
trial.3 29 The case was remanded for the limited purpose of allowing
the district court to determine whether defendant accepted responsibility
for his actions."' 0
United States v. Sawyer 31 demonstrates the difficulty in obtaining
a reversal of a denial of acceptance of responsibility.3 3 2 After defendant pleaded guilty, the probation officer found him remorseful and
recommended the downward adjustment under Section 3E1.1. The
Government did not object to this recommendation. However, the
district court denied the reduction.3" The Eleventh Circuit affirmed,
noting that although defendant pleaded guilty, he did so three months
after his arrest, and that the record was devoid of any facts clearly

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

Id. (quoting United States v. Harper, 972 F.2d 321, 322-23 (11th Cir. 1992)).
Id.
Id.
183 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1301.
Id.

329. Id.
330. Id. at 1301-02.
331. 180 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 1999).
332. In defendant's first appeal, the court left resolution of the acceptance-ofresponsibility adjustment under Section 3E1.1 to the discretion of the district court. On
remand the district court again refused to grant the acceptance-of-responsibility
adjustment. This appeal followed. Id. at 1321-22.
333. Id. at 1323.

20001

SENTENCING GUIDELINES

1227

establishing that defendant took personal responsibility for his actions. 33
The commentary to Section 3E1.1 gives examples of the type of
conduct that indicates a defendant has accepted responsibility. One
such example is the defendant's voluntary termination of his criminal
conduct. 385 In United States v. Matthews,33 6 the Eleventh Circuit
found that defendant's continued use of illegal drugs pending trial
constituted a continuation of the offense for which he was indicted.8 7
A second defendant in Matthews argued that he was entitled to the
reduction because, after his conviction, he gave a statement later used
to prosecute others. The district court granted a five-level downward
departure based on this cooperation 383 However, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the denial of the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction because
defendant did not cooperate during the investigation and forced the
Government to trial. 3
D. Chapter Four: CriminalHistory and Criminal Livelihood
1. Part A-Criminal History
a. U.S.S.G. Sections 4A1.1 and 4A1.2-Criminal History Category.
For a variety of reasons, the court rejected every challenge to criminal
history calculations that came before it in 1999. In United States v.
Wilson,34° defendant denied recollection of a prior conviction that was
scored in the PSR. At the sentencing hearing, the probation officer
stated that notes in the file from a previous probation officer indicated
that court documents had confirmed the prior conviction. 34 1 The
Eleventh Circuit found no clear error in the district court's reliance on
the hearsay statements of the absent probation officer, noting, however,
that a certified copy of the records would have been preferable.342
Additionally, in United States v. McClendon,3" the court held that
three misdemeanor worthless-check convictions were properly scored

334. Id.
335. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 application n.l(b).
336. 168 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 1999).

337. Id. at 1250.

338. Id.
339. Id.
340. 183 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 1999).
341. Id. at 1301.
342. Id.
343. 195 F.3d 598 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
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under Section 4A1.2(c)(1)'" because defendant received concurrent
sentences of twelve months probation on those charges.345
The court narrowly construed the application of Section 4A1.2(f)
in United States v. Shazier.147 That guideline provides, in relevant
part, that a diversionary disposition resulting from a finding of guilt only
counts as one prior criminal history point under Section 4A1.1(c).M
The court held that defendant should receive two criminal history points
under Section 4A1.1(b) for a prior six-month sentence, even though he
received a "first-offender pardon" restoring his civil rights after he
served the sentence.3 4
The court based its holding, in part, on
application note 10 to Section 4A1.2, which provides that sentences
resulting from pardons for reasons unrelated to innocence or errors of
law are to be counted. 30

The court further stated that the pardon

could not be treated as a diversionary disposition under Section 4A1.2(f)
because that guideline does not apply to sentences when confinement is
imposed and served. 31' Rather, according to the Eleventh Circuit,
Section 4A1.2(f) applies only to sentences not already counted under
Section 4A1.l(a) or (b). 5 2

344. Section 4A1.2(c)(1) provides, in relevant part, that a misdemeanor conviction for
"insufficient funds check" can be included in the criminal history calculations only if "(A)
the sentence was a term of probation of at least one year or a term of imprisonment of at
least thirty days, or (B) the prior offense was similar to an instant offense." U.S.S.G.
§ 4A1.2(c)(1).
345. 195 F.3d at 602.
346. Section 4A1.2(f) provides,
Diversion from the judicial process without a finding of guilt (e.g., deferred
prosecution) is not counted. A diversionary disposition resulting from a finding
or admission of guilt, or a plea of nolo contendere, in a judicial proceeding is
counted as a sentence under § 4A1.1(c) even if a conviction is not formally entered,
except that diversion from juvenile court is not counted.
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(f).
347. 179 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 1999).
348. Section 4A1.l(a) provides for 3 criminal history points for any prior sentence in
which the defendant was sentenced to more than 13 months in prison. Section 4Al.l(b)
provides for 2 criminal history points for any prior sentence of 60 days or more, but less
than 13 months in prison. Section 4A1.1(c) provides for 1 criminal history point for any
prior sentence not counted in either Section 4A1.1(a) or (b) (for example, any sentence of
less than 60 days in jail).
349. 179 F.3d at 1319-20.
350. Id. at 1319.
351. Id.
352. Id. This holding severely limits the usefulness of Section 4A1.2(f) if the
diversionary disposition resulted from a finding of guilt. If a sentence is not counted under
Section 4A1.1(a) or (b), it would receive only one criminal history point under Section
4A1.1(c), regardless of Section 4A1.2(f).
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In United States v. Coeur,3" defendant was serving a state sentence
when he was charged with being found in the United States after having
been previously deported. He received two criminal history points under
Section 4A1. 1(d) because he committed that federal crime while serving
another criminal justice sentence, that is, the state sentence. Defendant
argued that Section 4A1.1(d) did not apply because he actually
committed the federal offense when he re-entered the United States
prior to the imposition of his state sentence. 4 The Eleventh Circuit
disagreed, noting that at the time he was found in the United States,
defendant was serving another criminal justice sentence-his state
sentence.355
b. U.S.S.G. Section 4A1.3-Adequacy of Criminal History. Section
4A1.3(d) allows for a departure from the applicable criminal history
category "[i]f reliable information indicates that the criminal history
category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's
past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit
other crimes."3M The district court relied on Section 4A1.3(d) in
United States v. Magluta 57 to adjust upward each of the consecutive
sentences imposed for the offenses of bond jumping and presenting false
identification.5 8
The Eleventh Circuit upheld the departure in the bond-jumping case,
finding that the district court did not rely on the same facts it relied on
for the upward departure in the false-identification case.3 59 The court
explained,
The crimes to which the particular recidivism risk applies are different:
in the bond jump case, the risk of recidivism relates to the chance that
Magluta will jump bond in the future. In the false identification case,
the recidivism risk relates to the chance that Magluta will possess
and/or use more false identifications in the future." °

353.

354.
355.
United
arrest.
356.
357.
358.
359.

196 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 1999).

Id. at 1345.
Id. at 1346. Eleventh Circuit case law holds that the crime of being "found in" the
States begins when the alien enters this country and is not completed until his
Id.
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(d).
198 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated in part, 203 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2000).
198 F.3d at 1270.
Id. at 1283.

360. Id.
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2. Part B-Career Offenders and Criminal Livelihood
a. U.S.S.G. Section 4B1.1-Career Offender In United States v.
Rutherford,3"' the district court designated defendant as a career
offender based on two prior felony crimes of violence. Defendant
challenged the finding that his prior conviction for lewd assault under
Florida law was a crime of violence. Although the Florida statute
contains four different ways the crime can be committed, the record did
not indicate under which subsection defendant was convicted. 36 2 The
Eleventh Circuit noted that "'in determining whether a conviction
qualifies as a crime of violence, a court should look only to the elements
of the convicted offense, and not to the conduct underlying the conviction.'" 3" Finding that a conviction for lewd assault upon a child
always involves a substantial risk that physical force may be used
against the victim, the court held that a conviction under the Florida
statute qualifies as a predicate offense for application of the career
offender guideline.364
b. U.S.S.G. Section 4B1.4-Armed CareerCriminal. In a case of first
impression, the court was called upon in United States v. Richardson s.
to interpret the meaning of a "previous conviction" for purposes of the
Armed Career Criminal Act.366 That statute increases the punishment
for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (the crime of possession of a firearm by
a prohibited person) if the defendant has three previous convictions for

361.

175 F.3d 899 (11th Cir. 1999).

362.

Id. at 904-05.

363.
364.

Id. at 905 (quoting United States v. Lipsey, 40 F.3d 1200, 1201 (11th Cir. 1994)).
Id. In so finding the court relied on Ramsey v. INS, 55 F.3d 580 (11th Cir. 1995),

wherein the court held that subsection 1 of the same Florida statute is a felony for
deportation purposes under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii) because it constitutes a crime of
violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16. Id. at 584. The court in Ramsey explained, "Athough
a violation of [the Florida statute] might be accomplished without the use of physical force,
we conclude that the offense is a felony which involves a substantial risk that physical
force may be used against the victim in the course of committing the offense." Id. at 583.
The court in Rutherford found no "substantial difference" between the definition of a crime
of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16 and under the career offender guidelines. 175 F.3d at 905.
A "crime of violence" is defined as a felony that "by its nature, involves a substantial risk
[of] physical force against" the victim. 18 U.S.C. § 16 (1994). Section 4B1.2 defines a crime
of violence for career offender purposes as an offense punishable by a year or more in
prison that "involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another." U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2).
365. 166 F.3d 1360 (11th Cir. 1999).
366. Id. at 1361.
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either a violent felony or a serious drug offense.367 Defendant committed the charged felon-in-possession crime in 1995 and was sentenced in
1997 as an armed career criminal. In designating defendant as an
armed career criminal, the district court counted defendant's 1996
conviction as a predicate previous conviction. 36 8 The Eleventh Circuit
reversed, holding that "a conviction is 'previous' to a § 922(g) offense only
if the conviction occurred before the violation of the § 922(g) [offense],
not simply prior to conviction or sentencing for that violation."369 The
court 0further found that it was plain error to rely on the 1996 convic37
tion.
In sentencing defendant as an armed career criminal, the district court
in United States v. Rucker 71 departed downward from the applicable
guidelines range because the predicate prior drug convictions were "very
minor."W 72 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that once a prior
drug offense qualifies as a predicate offense for armed career criminal
or career offender purposes, the district court is without discretion to
look behind the conviction to determine whether the underlying offense
" 373

was "minor.

In United States v.Walker,3 74 defendant was sentenced as an armed
career criminal. After his direct appeal, one of the predicate convictions
used to enhance his sentence was vacated by the state court. Defendant
then moved for relief from his enhanced sentence based on 2q U.S.C.
§ 2255 and Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 75 In
a case of first impression, the Eleventh Circuit held that "pursuant to
federal habeas corpus, a district court may reopen and reduce a federal
sentence, once a federal defendant has, in state court, successfully
attacked a prior state conviction, previously used in enhancing the
federal sentence."3 76

367. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1994).
368. 166 F.3d at 1360-61.
369. Id. at 1361.
370. Id. at 1362; cf. United States v. Laihben, 167 F.3d 1364, 1366 (11th Cir. 1999)
(holding that a prior conviction for purposes of U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(a) has a different
meaning).
371. 171 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 1999).
372. Id. at 1361.
373. Id. at 1363-64.
374. 198 F.3d 811 (11th Cir. 1999).
375. Id. at 812-13.
376. Id. In so holding the court agreed with the other circuits that have considered the
issue. Id. at 813-14 (citing United States v. Cardoza, 129 F.3d 6, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1997);
United States v. Pettiford, 101 F.3d 199, 201 (1st Cir. 1996); Young v. Vaughn, 83 F.3d 72,
75-76 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Bacon, 94 F.3d 158, 161 n.3 (4th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Cox, 83 F.3d 336, 339 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Rogers, 45 F.3d 1141,
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E. ChapterFive: Determining the Sentence
1. Part C-Imprisonment (Safety Valve)
It is well settled that the safety valve applies to all sentences imposed
on or after the effective date of that provision, September 23, 1994, and
is not to be applied retroactively. In United States v. Pelaez,3 77 the
court rejected defendant's argument that his sentence was not imposed
until it was affirmed on direct appeal, which was after September 23,
sentence is imposed when the district court enters
1994, and held that ""a
378
the final judgment.

The safety valve is found in three places: 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), U.S.S.G.
Section 2D1.1(b)(6), and U.S.S.G. Section 5C1.2. U.S.S.G. Section 5C1.2,
which tracks 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), allows the court to sentence a
defendant below a minimum mandatory sentence if the defendant meets
five criteria. U.S.S.G. Section 2D1.1(b)(6) provides for a two-level
reduction in drug cases if the offense level is twenty-six or greater and
the defendant meets the criteria set forth in U.S.S.G. Section 5C1.2.
In United States v. Clavijo,379 the court clarified that relief from a
minimum mandatory sentence is available under Section 5C1.2, even if
the two-level reduction under Section 2D1.1(b)(6) is precluded because
the offense level is below twenty-six.3" Turning to the five criteria for
safety valve relief, the court focused on the requirement that a defendant
not possess a firearm in connection with the offense. The court held that
the reasonably foreseeable possession of a gun by a coconspirator does
not preclude safety valve relief under Section 5C1.2.81 The court
noted that the "mere possession" of a gun by a codefendant may trigger
the two-level enhancement under Section 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of
a dangerous weapon in connection with a drug offense. 382 However,
the determination of the Section 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement is made
independently of the safety valve determination.38

1143 (7th Cir. 1995); Clawson v. United States, 52 F.3d 806, 807 (9th Cir. 1995); United

States v. Nichols, 30 F.3d 35, 36 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Garcia, 42 F.3d 573, 581
(10th Cir. 1994)).
377. 196 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 1999).
378. Id. at 1205.
379. 165 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 1999).
380. Id. at 1344.
381. Id. at 1343-44.
382. Id. at 1343.
383. Id.
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Likewise, in United States v. Yate, 3 the court ruled that a finding
that defendant accepted responsibility under Section 3E1.1 does not
preclude a finding that defendant failed to satisfy the "tell all" requirement of the safety valve guideline.'
The court explained that a
defendant is eligible for an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction even
if he is silent as to relevant conduct beyond the offense of conviction, so
long as he does not falsely deny such conduct.'
However, the safety
valve requires that a defendant truthfully provide to the government all
information that he has concerning offenses that are part of the same
course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan.3" 7
In denying a safety valve reduction, the district court in United States
v. Espinosa3 8 stated that it had no way of knowing whether defendant
was telling the truth regarding his involvement in the case. Therefore,
the court simply accepted the Government's position that defendant did
not tell the complete truth.3" 9 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding
that the district court had "the responsibility for determining the
truthfulness of the information the defendant provided to the government."39 The court also noted that the burden of proof on this issue
lies with the defendant.39 1
2. Part D-Supervised Release
The seemingly simple matter of supervised release posed several
questions in 1999. In sentencing defendant to consecutive sentences for
3 92
separate offenses, the district court in United States v. Magluta
imposed consecutive terms of supervised release.3 93 The Eleventh
Circuit vacated the consecutive terms of supervised release and
remanded for resentencing based on 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) and the
commentary to U.S.S.G. Section 5G1.2, which provides that terms of
supervised release shall run concurrently with each other.3 4

384.

176 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 1999).

385. Id. at 1310.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. 172 F.3d 795 (11th Cir. 1999).

389. Id. at 796-97.
390. Id. at 797.
391. Id.
392. 198 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated in part, 203 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2000).
393. 198 F.3d at 1283.
394. Id.
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In United States v. Rhodes, 95 defendant argued that a three-year
supervised release term was improper because his offense was a
misdemeanor at the time the crime was committed.3" The Eleventh
Circuit agreed and remanded the case with instructions to impose a oneyear term of supervised release."
In United States v. Ramirez-Perez,398 the court vacated the portion
of defendant's sentence ordering his deportation upon release from
confinement because the Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act eliminated the district court's jurisdiction to order an aliendefendant deported as a condition of supervised release. 3
Finally, in United States v. Dempsey,4 °° the court held that a probation officer lacked authority to impose an occupational restriction on a
person serving a supervised release term."° The court explained that
under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and U.S.S.G. Section F1.5, only courts have
authority to impose such restrictions as a condition of supervised
release. 0 2
3. Part E-Restitution
The question of how to calculate loss for restitution purposes arose
several times in 1999. In United States v. Vaghela,4 "3 the court
calculated restitution in an illegal Medicare kickback case involving the
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS").4 HHS suffered
a loss as a result of illegal kickbacks from Medicare referrals to a
laboratory.4 °5 The court determined the loss to be the amount defendant received in kickbacks, rather than the amount paid by HHS for the
services rendered, absent any evidence that the laboratory did not
perform the services ordered by doctors or that any of the tests ordered
by doctors and paid for by HHS were not medically necessary.4

395. 177 F.3d 963 (11th Cir. 1999).
396. Id. at 967. Defendant's offense was making a false-compensation claim in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1920. Id. at 964.
397. Id. at 968.
398. 166 F.3d 1106 (11th Cir. 1999).
399. Id. at 1114.

400. 180 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1999).
401. Id. at 1326.
402. Id.

403. 169 F.3d 729 (11th Cir. 1999).
404. Id. at 736.
405. Id.
406. Id.
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In sentencing defendant for stealing money insured by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), the district court in United
States v. King" 7 ordered defendant to pay restitution for additional
money he stole from the armored truck along with the FDIC-insured
funds. The additional stolen money did not belong to the bank.4 "° The
Eleventh Circuit vacated that portion of the decision, holding that
restitution could not include the additional money because defendant
was neither charged with nor convicted of armored car theft, and hence
the armored car company was not a victim of an offense for which
defendant was convicted.4 °9
In sentencing defendant for conspiracy to possess stolen United States
mail, the district court in United States v. Alas 410 ordered defendant

to pay restitution for the entire value of the fraudulently cashed checks,
including the checks cashed by coconspirators while defendant was
incarcerated for an unrelated offense. 411 Reaffirming that a defendant
is responsible for all acts of the conspiracy that were reasonably
foreseeable to him, the court held that the cashing of the fraudulent
checks was reasonably foreseeable by defendant based on his resumed
participation in the conspiracy once released from custody, as well as the
lack of evidence indicating any attempt to withdraw from the conspiracy
during his incarceration.4 2
41 3 an arson case, the court upheld the
In United States v.Shugart,
restitution order that was based on the cost to replace a century-old
church that defendants had burned.4 4 The court explained that
"wihere actual cash value is difficult to ascertain-because an item is
unique, or because there is not a broad and active market for it-replacement cost may be a better measure of value."41 5 The court concluded
the district court properly determined the only effective way to restore
an equivalent of the victims' loss was to build a church "comparable
418 in
size and design on the same lot where the original church stood."
Finally, in United States v. Gregg,1 7 the court held that defendant
waived any objection to restitution "[bly expressly agreeing to the

407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.

178 F.3d 1376 (11th
Id. at 1377-78.
Id. at 1378.
196 F.3d 1250 (11th
Id. at 1251.
Id. at 1251-52.
176 F.3d 1373 (11th
Id. at 1375-76.
Id. at 1375.
Id.
179 F.3d 1312 (11th

Cir. 1999).

Cir. 1999).

Cir. 1999).

Cir. 1999).

1236

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

amount of restitution" and by failing to "object generally to the award of

418
restitution" in the trial court.

4. Part K-Departures
a. U.S.S.G. Section 5K1.1--SubstantialAssistance. Departures based
on substantial assistance do not often make it to the Eleventh Circuit
forefront. When they do, they usually focus on questions of law. For
example, in United States v. Head,1 9 the court reaffirmed that the
starting point for calculating a sentence reduction under U.S.S.G.
Section 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), based on substantial assistance,
is the420statutory mandatory minimum penalty, not the guideline
range.

b. Other Groundsfor Departures. Departures based on grounds other
than substantial assistance are another matter. In 1999 the Eleventh
Circuit issued a significant number of decisions regarding such
departures. The general trend in recent years, and continuing last year,
is to affirm upward departures, reverse downward departures, and
affirm the district court's decision not to depart downward.
Part A.4(b) of the introductory comments to Chapter One of the
guidelines allows for a departure if the case falls outside the heartland
of the applicable guidelines. The heartland is determined by comparing
the facts of the case with other guidelines cases. In making this
determination, the district court's decision is entitled to "substantial
deference."' 2 ' The first inquiry for the district court is whether a
factor is forbidden, encouraged, discouraged, or not addressed by the
guidelines.4 22 Forbidden factors include race, sex, national origin,
creed, religion, and socioeconomic status.4' A court may depart based
on an encouraged factor (for example, death resulting from the
offense 424 ) unless the guidelines already take that factor into account.425 If a factor is discouraged (for example, education and
vocational skills 426 ), or is an encouraged factor already taken into

418.
419.
420.
421.
United
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.

Id. at 1317.
178 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1208.
United States v. Melvin, 187 F.3d 1316, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Koon v.
States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996)).
Id.
U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10.
Id. § 5K2.1.
Melvin, 187 F.3d at 1320 (citing Koon, 518 U.S. at 96).
U.S.S.G. § 5H1.2.
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account by the guidelines (for example, disruption of government
function in a bribery offense427 ), a departure is allowed only when the
factor is "'present to an exceptional degree or in some other way makes
the case distinguishable from an ordinary case where the factor is
present."'
A factor not addressed by the Sentencing Commission
may warrant departure when "the court determines that the factor takes
the case out of the Guideline's heartland after considering the 'structure
and theory of both the relevant individual guidelines and the Guidelines
taken as a whole.'"429
In Melvin the district court relied on two grounds to depart upward 15
levels, increasing the sentencing range of 21 to 27 months imprisonment
to 108 to 135 months imprisonment. The first basis for departure was
the presence of multiple victims. While defendant was employed by the
housekeeping department of a hospital, he obtained personal information, such as birth dates and Social Security numbers, of 135 individuals,
of whom 112 had been juvenile patients at the hospital. Using this
information, defendant procured thirty-six unauthorized credit card
accounts from two companies, telephone service in the names of two
individuals, and identification cards in the names of other persons.43 °
After the district court relied on Section 2F1.1(b)(2) to add two offense
levels for more than minimal planning or multiple victims, the court
cited the number of victims in its decision to depart upward. 1 In
concluding the upward departure was not based on a factor that had
already been considered under the guidelines, the Eleventh Circuit noted
that application note 4 to Section 2F1.1 provides that a victim for
purposes of Section 2F1.I(b)(2)(B) "'refers to the person or entity from
which the funds come directly."" 32 Therefore, according to the Eleventh Circuit, the Section 2F1. 1(b)(2) adjustment "accounted solely for the
two financial institutions and the telephone provider that [defendant]
defrauded." 3 The adjustment "did not consider the indirect victims,
the children and their families, who suffered because of [defendant's]
scheme."4"

427.

Id. § 5K2.7.

428.
429.
430.
431.

Melvin, 187 F.3d at 1320 (quoting Koon, 518 U.S. at 96).
Id. at 1320-21 (quoting Koon, 518 U.S. at 96).
Id. at 1318-19.
Id. at 1319.

432.

Id. at 1321 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 application n.4).

433. Id.
434. Id. At sentencing the district court heard the testimony of the parents of two
victims, a four-month-old infant and a ten-year-old child. One parent testified that his
child received a bad credit rating because of defendant's offense.
The family had
experienced difficulty with the credit bureau in attempting to clear the child's credit
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The district court cited the vulnerability of the victims as another
basis for departure. Although the district court had already increased
defendant's offense level under Section 3A1.1 because of the vulnerable
victims, the court indicated that the victims' vulnerability distinguished
this case from the ordinary case in which this factor was present.435
The Eleventh Circuit upheld this basis for departure, stating, "From his
vantage, [the district judge] determined that in his seven years on the
bench he had only seen one case which he considered more morally
reprehensible. Consequently, the district court determined that this case
was both exceptional and distinguishable."""
After upholding the bases for the departure, the Eleventh Circuit
turned to the reasonableness of the extent and method of the departure.437 In departing upward fifteen levels to a sentence of 120 months
imprisonment, the district court indicated it was "repulsed by the nature
and circumstances of [defendant's] offense."43 The district court found
that defendant had "systematically victimized over a hundred hospitalized children and their families-victims that were weak and frail, and
particularly vulnerable due to their circumstances."43 9 In holding that
the departure was reasonable based on these findings, the Eleventh
Circuit rejected defendant's argument that the sentencing court should
have used some mathematical formula to account for the extreme extent
of the departure." °
In United States v. Sawyer,"1 the Eleventh Circuit upheld a twolevel upward departure under Section 5K2.3, which provides for an

history. Id. at 1319. An enhancement based on collateral consequences of the fraud, such
as erroneous credit reports for the children, appears to reflect a type of harm the guidelines
implicitly excluded from consideration in fraud cases, that is, "consequential damages." See
U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 application n.8(c). This exclusion calls into question the Eleventh
Circuit's finding that the district court could rely upon this basis to depart. See Koon, 518
U.S. at 96-97.
435. 187 F.3d at 1322.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id. at 1322-23.
439. Id. at 1323.

440. Id. at 1323-24. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the statutory maximum sentence
for defendant's combined convictions was 300 months because the grouping rules of the
guidelines do not apply when determining the cumulative statutory maximum sentence for
departure purposes. Id. at 1323 n.2.
441. 180 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 1999). In defendant's first appeal, the court concluded
that the district court erred in applying Section 2B3.1(b)(3), the bodily-injury adjustment.
On remand the district court followed the appellate mandate by removing the bodily-injury
adjustment, but substituted an adjustment for extreme psychological injury to the victim
under Section 5K2.3. Id. at 1321-22.
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upward departure if a victim suffered psychological injury "'much more
serious than that normally resulting from the commission of the
offense.'""' 2 One of the bank employees testified at sentencing that
more than two years after the robbery, she did not feel safe at work, was
especially cautious entering and leaving the bank, and had restricted her
daily activities."3 Based on this evidence, the court found that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in departing upward for
extreme psychological injury.4 "
In United States v. Davis,"5 defendant pleaded guilty to possession
of three or more images of child pornography. Based on "extraordinary
circumstances," the district court departed downward from offense level
sixteen to sentence him to two years probation. 44 6 The extraordinary
circumstances included "the absence of the victim" and "the fact that the
defendant made no use of the pornographic material other than for
personal use.""'
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that the
district court abused its discretion because these bases for departure
were not atypical." 8 The court explained, "[T]he harm resulting from
possession of child pronography occurs when one sustains a market for
such pictures. Therefore, it is not necessary for one to derive any benefit
from the child pornography or actively solicit the pornography, provided
one's actions play a role in the distribution network."" 9
In United States v. Steele,4 5 based on five grounds the district court
departed downward in sentencing defendant, a registered pharmacist
charged with dispensing controlled substances, pursuant to Section
52.451 The Eleventh Circuit rejected the first ground-that "[defendant's] conduct-dispensing prescription drugs that were legally in his
possession by filling forged prescriptions that appeared to be otherwise
valid-was not the target of [21 U.S.C.] § 841(a)(1), which was aimed
more at street dealers who sell illegal narcotics."' 5 2 According to the
Eleventh Circuit, filling false prescriptions falls within the heartland of
drug-trafficking offenses.45 3

442.

Id. at 1324 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 5K2.3).

443. Id.
444. Id.
445. 204 F.3d 1064 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).

446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.

Id. at 1065.
Id. at 1065-66.
Id. at 1066.
Id. (citation omitted).
178 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1232-33.
Id. at 1238.
Id. at 1239.
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The second ground for the departure was that defendant's loss of his
professional license constituted "major additional punishment ... which
has not been addressed by the Sentencing Commission. 4 In rejecting
this basis for departure, the court stated that a "departure based on
Steele's loss of his pharmacist license would negate an enhancement
imposed for Steele's abuse of his position as a pharmacist."' 55
The third ground for departure was that "the inclusion of the
substances with which the drugs were mixed to form tablets and pills
when computing the drug weight created a disparity when compared to
cases involving drugs that are not mixed with other substances."4 56
The Eleventh Circuit held that this ground was expressly precluded as
a basis for departure "because allowing a downward departure on this
ground would abrogate the requirement that the substances mixed with
drugs be included in the total drug weight."' 7
The appellate court also rejected the fourth ground for departure-that
defendant "made only a nominal profit from the drug sales in this case
(approximately $700, or the price of eight ounces of marijuana), but was
held accountable at sentencing for the monetary equivalent of 5,227
pounds of marijuana."458 According to the Eleventh Circuit, "difficulties in turning profits" falls within the heartland of drug-distribution
offenses.459
The final ground for departure was that defendant had a "serious
medical problem" that "apparently affected his mental functioning" at
the time of the offense.4'
Under Section 5K2.13 a significantly
decreased mental capacity can warrant a downward departure if it is
linked to the commission of the offense."' The Eleventh Circuit noted
that Section 5K2.13 had been amended during the pendency of the
appeal to add that "'[ijf a departure is warranted, the extent of the
departure should reflect the extent to which the reduced mental capacity

454. Id.
455. Id.; see also United States v. Hoffer, 129 F.3d 1196, 1204-06 (11th Cir. 1997).
456. 178 F.3d at 1239.
457. Id.; see also United States v. Lazarchik, 924 F.2d 211, 214 (11th Cir. 1991)

(holding that for purposes of sentencing guidelines calculations the court must use the total
weight of the pills distributed by defendant-that is, the weight of the drug contained in
the pill, plus the weight of any substances in which the drug is mixed-rather than just
the weight of the drug itself).
458. 178 F.3d at 1238.
459. Id. at 1240.
460. Id. at 1238.
461. See United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 1281, 1285 (11th Cir. 1998).
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contributed to the commission of the offense.'"462 .The court could not
determine whether the district court abused its discretion in departing
on this ground because there were no specific findings as to whether
defendant's "diminished mental capacity contributed to the commission
Thus, on remand the district court was directed to
of the crime."
assess anew whether defendant's mental condition warranted a
downward departure in light of the amended version of Section
5K2.13."
In United States v. Pickering,4 the district court relied on the
combination of five factors to support a downward departure that
resulted in a sentence of no imprisonment for three counts of armed
bank robbery.4' The Eleventh Circuit found that none of the first
three factors-aberrant behavior, diminished capacity, and personal
circumstances-could provide the basis for a downward departure when
viewed individually.4 7 First, the aberrant behavior basis was found
inapplicable to the robbery of four banks in four months because
defendant's conduct did "not constitute a single spontaneous and
thoughtless act."46 The court refused to consider defendant's argument that "'aberrant behavior in general'" could be based on multiple
4 69
acts because that argument was not presented to the district court.
The court then held that the second ground (that the robberies were
partially attributable to defendant's diminished capacity caused by his
heavy drug use) could not form the basis for a departure, nor could the
personal circumstances relied upon by defendant, including abuse by his
step father, rejection by his step mother, and the recent removal of his
girlfriend to another state by her parents.4 70

462. 178 F.3d at 1240 (quoting U.S.S.G § 5K2.13). The amendment also added an
application note defining "significantly reduced mental capacity" to mean that the
defendant "has a significantly impaired ability to (A) understand the wrongfulness of the
behavior comprising the offense or to exercise the power of reason; or (B) control behavior
that the defendant knows is wrongful." U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13 application n.1.
463. 178 F.3d at 1240.
464. Id. at 1240-41. The Eleventh Circuit stated that the amended version of Section
5K2.13 would apply at the resentencing. Id. at 1240.
465. 178 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 1999).
466. Id. at 1170-71.
467. Id. at 1172.
468. Id.
469. Id. at 1172 n.4 (quoting United States v. Kalb, 105 F.3d 426, 429 (8th Cir. 1997)).
470. Id. at 1170, 1172. Section 5H1.12 prohibits the district court from departing based
on such personal circumstances, which merely indicate a disadvantaged upbringing.
Defendant also argued on appeal that these circumstances represented a mental or
emotional condition that constituted a "discouraged" basis for departure under Section
5H1.3. Id. at 1172. While noting that such a departure would be "highly questionable,"
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Nonetheless, the court in Pickering noted that the commentary to
Section 5K2.0 allows for a departure in an "extraordinary case" when the
combination of characteristics or circumstances causes that case to differ
"'significantly from the "heartland" cases covered by the guidelines in a
way that is important to the statutory purposes of sentencing, even
though none of the characteristics or circumstances individually
distinguishes the case.'" 47 ' However, the court found that the district
court abused its discretion in relying on the three above-referenced
grounds collectively because it made "no findings and provided no
reasoning to support the conclusion that [defendant] presented the type
of extremely rare case contemplated by the Commission."472 The court
then found that the fourth basis for departure relied on by the district
court-the limited duration of the prosecutor's plea offer, which expired
before defendant had time to adequately consider it4 73-was an
impermissible basis for departure.4 74
The only ground for departure validated by the Eleventh Circuit was
defendant's postoffense rehabilitation.4 75 Despite finding that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in departing downward on this
ground, the Eleventh Circuit held that the manner in which the district
court departed was an abuse of discretion.4 76 The court explained that
a downward departure may be made along the horizontal or vertical axis

the court refused to delineate the precise contours of Section 5H1.3 because defendant did
not present the district court with this argument. Id.
471. Id. at 1173 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 commentary).
472. Id. The court explained that the district court did not
analyze the three relied-upon grounds under the quadripartite Koon topology in

order to determine whether they were "discouraged" factors.. . . [Tihe court failed
to undertake a refined assessment of the facts of [defendant's] case in order to
demonstrate that it fell outside of the heartland in a way important to the
statutory purposes of sentencing, and failed to distinguish his case from a typical
case in which the three relied-upon grounds were present.
Id.; cf United States v. Melvin, 187 F.3d 1316, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999).
473. The prosecutor offered defendant a lenient plea agreement that would expire if he
had not agreed to plead by 5:00 p.m. on the day the offer was made. Because of the limited
duration of the offer and a delay in counsel being able to visit defendant in jail, defendant
had only 45 minutes to consider the offer and discuss it with his lawyer before it expired.
The offer expired before he responded. 178 F.3d at 1170.
474. Id. at 1171, 1174. The Eleventh Circuit stated, "Ifa prosecutor wishes to offer a
defendant an 'exploding' plea bargain with a short fuse, as the prosecutor did here, this
decision is entirely within his or her prosecutorial discretion and does not constitute-either alone or in combination with other factors-a valid ground for departure." Id.
at 1174.
475. Id. While incarcerated, defendant aided over 70 others in receiving their general
equivalency diplomas and conducted religious group sessions. Id. at 1171.
476. Id. at 1174.
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of the sentencing table depending on the type of departure involved.477
When a defendant's actions "demonstrate acceptance of responsibility
after the offense has been committed-such as post-offense rehabilitation"-the downward departure must occur along the horizontal axis of
the sentencing table. 478 Thus, the district court should have departed
horizontally by reducing defendant's criminal history category from II to
4 79
I, rather than vertically by reducing his offense level.
As a general rule, a district court's denial of a downward departure is
not reviewable on appeal.' 0 However, such decisions are reviewable
if they are based on an erroneous belief that the court lacked authority
to so depart.48 ' In United States v. Chase,48 2 the district court refused to depart downward, indicating it had heard all the evidence,
considered all the arguments, and believed that none of the arguments
justified a downward departure. 4 s The Eleventh Circuit affirmed,
holding that when nothing in the sentencing record indicates otherwise,
the court of appeals will assume the sentencing court understood that it
had the authority to depart downward. 4
In United States v. Rudisill,485 defendant argued that the district
court thought it had no authority to depart downward based on the
disparity in sentences between defendant and his codefendant.4 6 The
Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's comments at sentencing as
a whole and concluded that the district court did not misunderstand its
authority. 7 Rather, the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court
exercised its discretion to deny the downward departure based on its
determination that defendants were not actually similarly situated.4 8
A decision like that is not reviewable on appeal.489
In United States v. Mignott,4 ° the sentencing court refused to depart
downward based on defendant's willingness to submit to deportation
without a hearing, stating that "although I can order immediate

477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.

Id. at 1174-75.
Id. at 1175.
Id.
See United States v. Chase, 174 F.3d 1193, 1195 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id.
174 F.3d 1193 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1194-95.
Id. at 1195.

485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.

187 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1265.
Id. at 1265-66.
Id. at 1266.
Id. at 1265.
184 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 1999).
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deportation upon completion of the defendant's sentence, it's not grounds
for departure, in my view."491 On appeal defendant argued that the
district court's refusal to depart downward was based on its understanding that it had no discretion to depart on that ground. 492 The Eleventh
Circuit found that the district court's statement was ambiguous, thereby
allowing review of the district court's refusal to depart downward.49 3
The court then noted, "Whether a defendant's consent to deportation
constitutes a mitigating circumstance of a kind not taken into consideration by the sentencing commission is a question of first impression in
this Circuit."4"' The court adopted the approach of four other circuits
that requires "defendants to proffer a nonfrivolous defense to deportation
495
before recognizing consent to deportation as a ground for departure."
The court then found that defendant had not asserted any defense to
deportation. 4" He simply argued that his consent to the deportation
would save the Government the expense of a hearing. 497 The court
considered this benefit to the Government de minimis because defendant
had "no discernible defense to deportation." 498 Thus, the court found
that the district court lacked authority to depart downward because
defendant "showed neither a mitigating circumstance not adequately
considered by the Sentencing Commission nor that his case was outside
the heartland of cases in which an alien faces deportation."'

491. Id. at 1289.
492.
493.
494.

Id.
Id. at 1290.
Id.

495. Id. at 1291. The First, Second, and Ninth Circuits require a showing of a
nonfrivolous defense. See United States v. Galvez-Falconi, 174 F.3d 255, 260 (2d Cir.
1999); United States v. Clase-Espinal, 115 F.3d 1054, 1059 (1st Cir. 1997); United States
v. Flores-Uribe, 106 F.3d 1485, 1486 (9th Cir. 1997). The Third Circuit adopted a similar
approach, but also requires the Government to recommend such a departure. See United
States v. Marin-Castaneda, 134 F.3d 551, 555 (3d Cir. 1998). However, the Eighth Circuit
has authorized a departure based on consent to deportation when the parties have filed a
joint motion requesting it. See United States v. Cruz-Ochoa, 85 F.3d 325, 325-26 (8th Cir.
1996).
496. 184 F.3d at 1291.
497. Id.
498. Id.
499. Id. The court then noted that although defendant did not challenge the district
court's jurisdiction to order deportation, the Government indicated the district court lacked
this jurisdiction under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996, which took effect on April 1, 1997. Id. This Act, which applies to all cases pending
on appeal as of September 10, 1997, eliminated the district court's jurisdiction to order
deportation. Id.; see also United States v. Alborola-Rodriguez, 153 F.3d 1269, 1272 (11th
Cir. 1998); United States v. Romeo, 122 F.3d 941, 943-44 (11th Cir. 1997). Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit vacated the order of deportation and remanded the case to allow the
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The decision in United States v. Matthews5°° is somewhat odd
because the court appears to have reviewed the merits of the district
court's refusal to depart downward without assessing whether the
district court erroneously believed it lacked authority to so depart. °1
The Eleventh Circuit stated that employment 0 2 and family ties and
responsibilities 3 may warrant a downward departure if these concerns are "'present to a degree substantially in excess of that which
ordinarily is involved in the offense.'" 50 ' However, no departure was
warranted in this case because defendant's employment as a truck driver
and support of his seven-year-old son did not "distinguish him significantly from the rest of the general population."55
III.

SIGNIFICANT GUIDELINES-RELATED ISSUES

A.

When Do the Guidelines Apply?
In United States v. Diaz,'°c the court held that the guidelines applied
because the conspiracy began before the effective date of the guidelines,
but continued after that date.50 7 The court explained that defendant
is required to "take affirmative steps prior to the effective date [of the
guidelines] to terminate and disavow any participation in the conspiracy
in order for the guidelines not to apply to his sentencing.""~ Finding
no proof that defendant took those steps, the Eleventh Circuit held that
defendant was properly sentenced under the guidelines."

district court to delete the order or to modify it to provide that defendant be turned over
to the Immigration and Naturalization Service for appropriate proceedings upon completion
of his term of imprisonment. 184 F.3d at 1291-92. A new sentencing hearing would not
be required upon remand because the district court's action would operate in defendant's

favor. Id. at 1292.
500.

168 F.3d 1234 (l1th Cir. 1999).

501. Id. at 1249.
502. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.5.
503. Id. § 5H1.6.
504.

168 F.3d at 1248-49 (quoting United States v. Mogel, 956 F.2d 1555, 1563 (11th

Cir. 1992)).
505. Id. at 1249.
506. 190 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 1999).

507. Id. at 1257.
508. Id.
509. Id.
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B.

When Is a Guideline "Clarifying"?
United States v. Summers510 provides an excellent analysis of when
a new guideline is considered clarifying, as opposed to nonclarifying, for
purposes of an ex post facto analysis. The question in Summers was
whether a sentencing guideline enhancement for an express threat of
death"' violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Defendant committed a
bank robbery before the 1997 guidelines became effective, but was
sentenced thereafter. The district court utilized the definition of
"express threat of death" found in the 1997 guidelines.512 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the new guidelines were more
onerous than the previous guidelines and were not merely clarifying.5 '
The court explained that the amendment did not explain the pre-existing
guideline because it changed the language of the guideline to express the
In addition to changing the
Sentencing Commission's intent." 4
guideline's unambiguous language, the amendment overturned Eleventh
Circuit precedent.5 15 After extensively analyzing the language of the
amendment, the court concluded that it made a substantive change in
the law that would not be applied retroactively."'
C. Resentencing Procedures
While the Eleventh Circuit did not directly address the particular
sentencing guideline provisions applied by the district court, United
States v. Yost 5" is important to guideline decisions because it explains
the procedures a district court should follow in resentencing a defendant.
After the sentencing hearing, but before the written final judgment was
entered, the district court realized it had erred in applying the guidelines and held another sentencing hearing. Defendant appealed and
argued that the district court lacked authority under Rule 35(c) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to resentence him as it did. 518
Rule 35(c) allows a district court to "'correct a sentence that was
imposed as a result of arithmetical, technical, or other clear error'"

510.
511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.
518.

176 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 1999).
U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F).
176 F.3d at 1330-31.
Id. at 1333.
Id. at 1331.
Id.
Id. at 1331-33.
185 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1179-80.
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within seven days of the imposition of the sentence.519 The Eleventh
Circuit was asked to determine "whether the phrase 'other clear error'
includes any of the district court's mistakes at the initial sentencing."520 The court noted that "under Rule 35(c), the district court may
not simply change its mind, and any error to be corrected under that
subsection must be obvious."52 ' Here, the error was found to be
obvious because the district court used the wrong guideline at the first
sentencing.522
Nonetheless, defendant also argued that the district court did not have
authority to revisit its prior ruling regarding consideration of his bank
fraud as relevant conduct regardless of whether the district court had
authority to resentence him. 523 The Eleventh Circuit rejected this
argument and adopted the holistic approach that applies when an
24
appellate court vacates a sentence and remands for resentencing.
In that situation "the sentence becomes void in its entirety and the
district court is free to revisit any rulings it made at the initial
sentencing."5 25 Finding no difference between resentencing on remand
and resentencing under Rule 35(c), the court held that "it takes only one
clear error to give the district court authority under Rule 35(c) to
at which the court may correct any other
conduct an entire re-sentencing
5 26
errors, clear or not."
IV.

CONCLUSION

The sentencing cases analyzed in this Article represent only a portion
of the total number of sentencing guideline cases heard by the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals during 1999. Pursuant to Eleventh Circuit
Rule 36-1, the court disposes of numerous cases in unpublished opinions.
As fewer guideline amendments are enacted and as the guideline case
law becomes more established, the overall number of guideline cases
decided by the Eleventh Circuit probably will decrease. However, it

519. Id. at 1180 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(c)) (emphasis added by court).
520. Id. In dicta the Eleventh Circuit noted a split among the circuits as to whether
a sentence was imposed for Rule 35(c) purposes when it was orally pronounced by the

district court, as opposed to when the written judgment of conviction was entered. Id. at
1180 n.3. The court declined to address this question because it held that the district court
had authority to resentence defendant as it did under Rule 35(c). Id.
521. Id. at 1181.
522. Id.
523. Id.
524. Id.
525. Id.
526. Id.
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appears that cases involving certain issues, such as guideline departures,
will increase in the future.
In 1999 the court issued published decisions in more guideline
departure cases than in recent years. Guideline departures that are
outside the heartland of cases will always turn on the unique facts of
each case. Based on the individual characteristics of each departure, as
well as the lengthy sentences dictated by the sentencing guidelines,
these issues will undoubtedly consume more of the court's time in the
future.
As in past years, the court has consistently refused to entertain issues
that are not clearly preserved in the district court, absent plain error.
Many legitimate appellate issues advanced by criminal defendants in
1999 were affirmed as a direct result of counsel failing to preserve them
properly in the district court. The Eleventh Circuit case law on this
point is clear. If the error is not plain and does not affect the substantial rights of the defendant, the defendant will not obtain relief on
appeal. Thus, it is important that counsel properly preserve any error
in the district court. Moreover, when a court's ruling at sentencing is
ambiguous, counsel should seek clarification from the district court
during the sentencing hearing.
Finally, counsel should note that even the most meritorious issues
pertaining to the sentencing guidelines will not be reviewed on appeal
if counsel enters into a plea agreement that contains a waiver of the
client's right to appeal his sentence. In 1999 the court reiterated that
a waiver-of-appeal clause in a plea agreement will prohibit 5a27defendant
from appealing his sentence-even if there is blatant error.

527. See United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166, 1169 (11th Cir. 1999).

